

MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Jan 07

Approved for Release

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170101

Area of Interest Update

- Somali, Ethiopian forces advance on Kismayo; IO between Hamas, Fatah in Gaza
 - Somali gov't, Ethiopian forces continued advance toward southern coastal town of Kismayo
 - Somali PM Ghedi offered negotiations with Islamic Courts Council to stem new offensive
 - Islamists refused, citing stipulation that Ethiopia must withdraw prior to negotiations
 - PM claims Islamists harboring 3 key planners of 1998 East Africa Embassy attacks
 - Fighting intensified in Somali town of Jilib, gateway to city of Kismayo
 - Islamists fighters thought to have 3,000 members left; preparing for 'last stand'
 - Leader vowed insurgency in Ethiopia, Somalia will follow
 - IO current weapon of choice between Gaza factions
 - Hamas, Fatah using radio as primary weapon against each other
 - Observers, residents fear IO will spawn civil unrest
- *Offensive targeting Somali Islamists exceeds stated gov't goals; likely to cause extensive civilian displacement, near-term insurgent activity.*



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
Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: "Outrage over killing of Gaza boys"

BBC News, 11 Dec: "Arab League hopes for Beirut deal"

(b)(6)


"Kiriyenko Stresses Iran's 'inalienable right' to develop peaceful nuclear activities"



SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170101

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - 31 Dec, OMS statement on reported capture of JAM leader Hassan Salim
 - OMS states Salim was member of JAM, but had split from the group four months ago
 - Statement made in context of media reporting on Salim's suspected involvement in mass killings
 - Claimed Salim personally responsible
 - Media report on Diwaniyah protests organized by OMS in response to killing of Saab al-Amiri
 - JAM has reportedly transitioned from recruiting, surveillance to more active militant role in southern Salah ah Din province
 - Change in posture occurred over past two months
 - Activity focused on Sunni villages surrounding Logistical Support Area Anaconda



1.4c

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SOURCES:
IOTF NEW SUMMARY, 31DEC

1.4c

JAM transition to active militant posture in Southern Salah Ad Din


SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170101

- **December suicide attacks** Current Situation
 - **Suicide attacks decreased for third consecutive month**
 - **Monthly total of 34 incidents**
 - Down from 3-month average of 49 attacks per month
 - Down from 2006 monthly average of 38 attacks per month
 - **SVBIED remains most common suicide TTP**
 - **Accounted for 71% of total suicide attacks in December**
 - Over 80% of 2006 suicide attacks SVBIEDs
 - **Suicide attack locations continue to be concentrated MND-B, followed by MND-N, MNF-W**
 - **December attacks decreased for several reasons:**
 - ISF, CF operations hindering flow of FF at Syrian border
 - Ongoing Hajj pilgrimage
 - Seasonal weather
 - Cold, precipitation slows transit time of FF over northern routes from Syria
- ***Suicide attack techniques, targeting remain consistent in spite of decreased number of suicide attacks this month. Expect current attack levels to continue through early January.***

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:



SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170101

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.
- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c


- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, ~~control sectarian violence~~, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue ~~1.4c, 1.4b, 1.4d~~ pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170102~~

Area of Interest Update

- Islamists abandon Kismayo; Somali PM urges deployment of AU force, offers amnesty
 - Islamists pushed from Kismayo by militia loyal to Somali government supported by Ethiopian forces
 - Islamic Courts Council (ICC) fighters reportedly withdrew to south toward Somali border with Kenya
 - Kenya reinforcing border security forces in attempt to prevent border incursions
 - Kenyan Pres Kibaki called for summit of East African countries to mitigate regional impact of instability
 - UN estimates 30,000 IDPs within Somalia
 - Somali Prime Minister Gedi offered amnesty to Islamist fighters who turn in weapons
 - Stated ICC fighters had been “misled by int’l terrorists”
 - Stressed no amnesty for ICC leaders
 - Called on African Union to help stabilize the country

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c




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
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OSC (b)(6) “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF/20170102
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update: 2 January

- Recent Reporting:
 - The threat of IEDs from JAM elements to CF is expected to significantly increase beginning in January 2007
 - Threat greatest in and around Sadr City as well as in southwest Baghdad
 - In December 06 JAM have been distributing IEDs, large amounts of plastic explosives, remote controls, and large ordinance
 - Elements from both regular and rogue JAM units likely involved in preparations
 - Media outlets cover al-Hayat newspaper report Saddam possibly handed over to JAM by IG prior to execution
 - Amateur video of execution apparently cited as evidence



Assessment: Increased IEDs are likely reflecting JAM defensive posture in certain areas due to expectation of operations by ISF and CF in January. IEDs will likely be placed along roads leading into Sadr City, other JAM strongholds. JAM may seek to capitalize on perception of organizational role in Saddam's execution to rally further support from Shi'a populace.

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SOURCES:
Associated Press,
Al-Jazeera,

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170102 For display only to IRQ		
CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 23 – 29 December 2006
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sunni tribes unifying against JAM in Jisr Diyala • AQI releases audio message describing the ISI which would enforce Shari'a law, states ISI already has broad support base • Letter reportedly written by Saddam on 5 Nov called on Iraqis not to hate "invaders of their country"
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Sectarian incidents: 188; down 13% previous week • National Sectarian casualties: 606; up 32% • National executions: 296 KIA; down 25% • Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 129; down 32% • Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 472; up 20% • Baghdad executions: 216 KIA; down 41%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sadr calls for calm after Sahib al-Amiri's death and subsequent 27 Dec anti-IG, anti-American march in Najaf
Population movements	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Displaced families: IOM: 57,166 (up 14,932); MoDM: 55,003 (No update) • Majority of IDPs flowing out of Baghdad, Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, Basrah, Dhi-Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk and Tameem, and into Anbar, Baghdad, Wassit and Diyala.
<p>Assessment: Overall situation remains serious. In attempt to gain momentum for ISI, AQI utilizing IO, increasing pressure on Sunni groups to join. Rise in HP attacks targeting civilians will sustain cycle of sectarian violence within Baghdad. Sadr's comments designed to control JAM and avoid open confrontation with CF.</p>		
12		

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//Z017010Z

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c


- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.


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Page 14 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170103

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadr, speaking at Eid prayers in al-Kufa, stated Saddam execution video should be banned
 - Gol opening investigation of incident
 - Head of Sadr bloc, Nasir al-Rubay'i stated Sadrists condemned behavior of individuals at execution
 - 1 Jan, demonstrations protesting Saddam's execution included anti-Sadr themes
 - Protests occurred in northern Baghdad; Duar, south of Tikrit
 - Demonstrators fired small arms, denounced Shi'a leaders
 - 'Muqtada, you coward', 'Hakim! Yellow-belly! Agent of Americans!'



Assessment: Sadr's statements likely intended to mitigate negative reaction; condemnation reflects effort to present moderate image; deny IG additional reason to target Sadrists. Despite censure, invocation of Sadr during execution provides positive link between demise of former regime and Sadrist movement among select Shi'a.

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SOURCES:
IOTF NEW SUMMARY, 2JAN
Informed Comment, 2Jan

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//Z0170103

- **Current Situation**
 - **EFP, IED attacks in Diyala**
 - **Attack targeted CF Convoy in Baqubah**
 - Device was 7 array EFP
 - EOD Post blast analysis indicates sophisticated construction
 - EFP's rare in Diyala, averaging 2 per month since June 06
 - First EFP since 25 November
 - Incident continues to demonstrate the outflow of TTP's to Diyala
 - **EFP usage implicates JAM**
 - Construction of Sunday's device indicates communication with mainstream JAM EFP construction/employment
 - **IED's targeting CF in Diyala up significantly in December**
 - 151 IED attacks in December was highest monthly rate in 2006
 - Was a 50% increase over previous 2006 high set in July at 101
 - **Increased IED usage likely due to ongoing CF operations in Diyala**
 - Trend analysis indicates hasty construction, emplacement; likely result of amplified CF pressure
 - Most IEDs in Diyala emplaced by Sunni extremists in Sunni dominated areas
 - **While EFP attacks should continue to be rare, expect IEDs targeting CF in Diyala to increase over first two weeks in January as Shi'a militias, Sunni extremists attempt to counter CF/ISF operations within MND-N.**

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:


Trends Data

MND-N Daily 1.4c JAN 07 – 012359C JAN 07

CIOC Information Paper – 13 December 2006, Diyala – Sectarian Vompetition and Reasons for Violence



SECRET//REL TO USA, ILCFI//Z0170105
For display only to IIRG



Outlook: Shahid Allah

- Shahid Allah (SA) is a charitable outreach organization distinct from OMS, created by Sadr
 - Targets educated, elite Iraqi Shi'a and is composed of political and cultural committees
 - Shahid Allah leader, Saab al-Amiri, was killed during a detention operation
 - Amiri was close to Sadr; well-known figure in Najaf and an effective interlocutor with local government elements
- Sadr reportedly ordered all OMS offices to change their name to Shahid Allah in Jul 06
 - Full implementation not evident
- Shahid Allah reportedly involved in JAM funding and operations
 - Reports indicate Shahid Allah may play role in chain of command between OMS and regional JAM elements
 - Reporting indicates Amiri was conduit for passing Sadr's orders regarding IED operations against CF to JAM

Assessment: Sadr's creation of Shahid Allah, renaming of OMS likely to increase appeal of Sadrist teachings and political activities. However, SA likely tied to illicit activity and will continue to support JAM operations. Impact of Amiri's killing on Shahid Allah's strategic direction, operations uncertain. Sadr likely to exploit Amiri's death, draw attention to group.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//Z0170104

Area of Interest Update

- IAEA reviewing aid to Iran; Turkish PM offers mediation in Levant; Kenya closes Somali border
 - IAEA undergoing review of technical aid projects to Iran to ensure no violations of new UN sanctions
 - Current aid primarily deals with humanitarian radioisotope projects such as pharmaceuticals
 - Several projects could be identified as unauthorized under new scope outlined by UNSCR 1737 on 23 Dec
 - Turkish PM met with Lebanese leaders in Beirut
 - PM Erdogan stated visit aims to “assist the Lebanese reach an agreement on the issues under discussion”
 - Hezbollah deputy leader stated opposition leaders will plan new way ahead this week
 - Indicated focus remains on demand for early parliamentary elections
 - Kenya closed border with Somalia
 - Kenya requested Ethiopia set up IDP camps within Somalia to ensure Islamist fighters do not cross border
- *Developing nations within the IAEA will object to more restrictive interpretations due to concern of precedent impacting future aid.*




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
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




SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//ZD170104
For display only to Iraq

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadrists reportedly revised list of conditions to rejoin government, seeking UIA acceptance
 - Sadrists also reportedly prepared statement announcing end of suspension
 - Conditions relate to de-Ba'athification, Iraqi sovereignty, end of 'interference' by US, UK embassies
 - Baghdad JAM elements reportedly planned to transport video of kidnapped US, Austrian contractors to Najaf, early Jan
 - Likely same video released to int'l media on 3 Jan by "Mujahideen of Jerusalem Company"
 - Kidnappings occurred in Southern Iraq, 16 Nov
 - Recording allegedly made on 21 Dec
 - No additional info regarding location of hostages



Assessment: Sadrists showing flexibility on demands to rejoin government; rejoining subject to acceptance of conditions by UIA. "Mujahideen of Jerusalem Company" likely front for JAM or splinter element; release of recording intended as proof of life, impetus for renewed negotiations; targets Coalition for IO value.

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SOURCES:

1.4c 3Jan, Sadrists preparing to end suspension of political activities in early Jan.

1.4c 3Jan, JAM elements transporting CD recording of kidnapped US, Austrian contractors

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170104

- **SAFIRE in MNF-W**
 - **CH-46 in AO Denver targeted by SAFIRE**
 - Point of origin IVO 30-40 cars in traffic jam
 - Flight characteristics noted in SIGACT indicate possible MANPAD
 - Dark spiral smoke trail observed
 - Attack was ineffective
 - Would be first confirmed MANPAD incident in AO Denver if verified
 - **MNF-W caches recovered**
 - Recent operations nearby have recovered MANPADS in weapons caches
 - Weapons caches likely attributable to AQI related organizations
 - Recent uncorroborated reporting specifically cited AQI affiliated capability to employ MANPADS in MND-B, MND-N
 - **MANPAD incidents rare nationwide**
 - Last MANPAD incident was on 13 NOV 06; last in MNF-W was 10 OCT 2006
 - 20 MANPAD incidents total since 1 FEB 06
 - SAFIRE incidents of all types average 18 incidents per week
- **MANPAD employment remains infrequent. While not confirmed, yesterday's incident possibly demonstrates AQI-affiliated desire to attack CF aircraft for IO impact.**

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:


Trends Data

1.4a

DOMINANT WARRIOR—ORGANIZATION OF THE SARAYA AL-JIHAD
ORGANIZATION IN IRAQ

SIGACT

1.4a



Data represents reporting from CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
Data time period: 190001DEC06 – 252400DEC06

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCEI//20170104

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170105~~

Area of Interest Update

- Iran claims to have doubled nuclear feedstock
 - Head of Iranian Atomic Energy Org claimed Iran has produced, stored 250 tons of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas
 - Iran claimed 110 tons of UF6 in April 06
 - IAEA reported 165 tons of UF6 in November 06
 - Official asserted stockpile is well-protected in tunnels
 - IAEA reports have documented problems with Iranian UF6 conversion
 - Iranian conversion processes have struggled to create UF6 in sufficient purity
 - Impure UF6 would increase overall volume required
 - Iranian parliament passed legislation obliging gov't to reduce IAEA cooperation, accelerate nuclear work
 - Bill gives Pres Ahmadinejad authority to quit Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
 - Nuclear official claimed no intention of NPT withdrawal

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c



President Ahmadinejad


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
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OSC IAP (b)(6) "Kiryenko Stresses Iran's 'inalienable right' to develop peaceful nuclear activities"






SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170105

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadrists issue statement denying Sadr among Saddam executioners
 - Iraqi news website reported Sadr was one of six executioners
 - Sadrists, Fadilah party respond to reports of upcoming large-scale CF operations against JAM
 - Sadrists urged IG to prevent CF operations against JAM; claimed US motivated by revenge for 'losses' during 2004 Sadr uprising
 - **Stated IG should take over security control to 'stop these plans'**
 - Fadilah party warned of 'dire consequences' if operations conducted against JAM'
 - Urged IG to assume security authority, refuse to implement plans that undermine political process



Assessment: Media reports of Sadr's involvement in Saddam's execution will reinforce sectarian tensions; Sadrists attempting to mitigate negative reaction; deny IG additional reason to target organization. Fadilah party statements reflect belief among Shi'a that loss of JAM would leave Shi'a more vulnerable to Sunni extremist attacks.

31

SOURCES:

OpenSource: 'Well-Versed Source' Says MAS one of Saddam's executioners, 4Jan
OpenSource: Sadr not among Saddam executioners, 4Jan
Arab Times: Kuwaiti in talks to buy Saddam's 'noose'
OpenSource: Iraqi Shiite Figures Warn of 'Dire Consequences' of US attack on JAM, 4Jan

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170105

Current Situation

- **VBIED in Mansour**
 - **VBIED Targeted Gas Station**
 - VBIED targeted civilians in queue for fuel
 - Initially reported as multiple VBIED, later confirmed single VBIED with secondary explosion of station
 - **Gas stations targeted in the past**
 - Dual target as civilian gathering place, potential for secondary explosive effects
 - Axis of black market commerce
 - **Attacks targeting public gathering places; known AQI, extremist TTP**
 - Gathering places, large public gatherings provide spectacular numbers of casualties, draw international media attention
 - Shi'a station owners/tribes also targeted
 - Continued sectarian violence will further destabilize IG, contribute to ongoing IO campaign
- ***Expect attacks targeting public gatherings to continue as AQI, extremists work to inflame sectarian violence throughout Baghdad in an effort to undermine IG, MNF reconstruction efforts, draw international media attention.***

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

SIGACT 1.4a
MND-B 1.4a

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170105
For display only to IRQ

Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI volume down 144 to 7
 - Claimed complete control of “all streets and cities of Mosul State”
 - Warned Sunnis to be cautious in marketplaces, public facilities in Baghdad
 - Warned CF of increased targeting; storming of bases
- AS propaganda volume down 6 to 17; included claims of 1 x SVBIED, 2 x VBIED
 - Released video showing gruesome scenes of dead bodies, extensive damage of al-Hashimiyaht village in Diyala; claimed damage from American air, ground operations
- IAI propaganda volume up 5 to 36; included claims of 5 attacks against JAM
 - Released video accusing Safavids p[REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d of inciting and assisting occupation; warned of possible shift to 1.4b, 1.4d targets
 - Miscellaneous propaganda volume up 65 to 85
 - Conqueror's Army (CA) stated Maliki Government close to perishing
 - CA appealed for worldwide Sunni support; claimed over 1 million Sunnis killed in Iraq

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume down 22 to 11; included claim of 1 x VBIED
 - Ba'ath Party stated execution of Saddam would make future negotiations impossible; implied terror threat to America; [REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170105

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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34

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//Z0170100

Area of Interest Update

- Haniyah, Abbas plea for calm in Gaza; China calls for Iranian response; Zawahri urges guerrilla war
 - Pres Abbas, PM Haniyah issued joint plea for calm following surge of factional violence in Gaza
 - First meeting between leaders in past two months
 - Independent Muslim cleric shot following sermon urging factional peace
 - Chinese Pres Hu Jintao called for Iranian response to international concern over its nuclear program
 - Remark followed meeting with Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani in Beijing
 - Larijani stated Iran will adhere to NPT, but that could change if threatened; delivered letter from Ahmadinejad
 - AQ deputy Zawahri urged Somali Islamists to conduct guerrilla operations in web audio statement
 - Zawahri: “you must ambush, mine, raid and (carry out) martyrdom campaigns so that you can wipe them out”
 - Diplomats called for rapid peacekeeping deployment; Ethiopia announced withdrawal within two weeks
- *Iran gauging China’s appetite for tougher UN sanctions; Zawahri message targets AQ franchise elements, expect extremist operations.*




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
Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSD (b)(6) “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170108
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - 5 Jan, Media reports claim JAM mobilizing for sectarian violence
 - Reports included images of alleged JAM members gathering in Baghdad
 - PM Maliki's office denied reports
 - MUC claimed evidence of JAM plans to attack Sunni neighborhoods
 - MUC identified areas to be attacked: Adl, Adhamiyah, Shu'la, Ghazaliyah neighborhoods
 - 5 Jan, 38 reported sectarian incidents in Baghdad unusually high, especially for Friday
 - Indications select Sadr advisors have warned him against possibly disbanding JAM
 - Advisors concerned Sadr could no longer claim he is resisting occupation or defending the Shi'a
 - JAM disbandment in PIC provinces offered by Sadrists' during negotiations to return to IG



(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

Alleged JAM mobilization

Assessment: Specific number of sectarian attacks on 5 Jan conducted by JAM unknown. However, high one-day total likely reflects JAM activity in mixed and Sunni-dominated neighborhoods prior to perceived start of major CF operations. Sadrists unlikely to disband JAM without extracting significant concessions from IG and rival Shi'a parties in UIA.

38

SOURCES:

OpenSource: Militias to launch 'Large-Scale Attack' on Eastern Baghdad; 50 Bodies Found, 5Jan

OpenSource: BBC Monitoring: Iraq Briefing 0400, 5Jan

1.4c 4JAN, JAM weapons reportedly transported from Kirkuk to Mosul area

OpenSource: Maliki's office dismisses AMS Statement , 5Jan

JAM weapons reportedly transported from Kirkuk to Mosul area, early Jan

Allegedly transported by cargo vehicles with government license plates

Sent to Quwair Base, provided to Tall'Afar (10% Shi'a) Shi'a fighters or unspecified Mosul terrorists

JAM transporting weapons intention unknown; possibly monitoring Sunni extremist activities, potential threats to small Shi'a population or Kurdish expansion activities.

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//Z0170100
For display only to IRQ

Current Situation

- **Kidnapping near Basra**
 - **Civilian contractor kidnapped**
 - Initially detained by IP for unknown cause, then released
 - Returning to Basra when IP escort left civilian unprotected
 - Abducted near AL-Harithah with 2 Iraqi interpreters
 - Similar to incident in November when 4 US citizens, 1 Austrian were abducted in same area
 - **Probable JAM connection**
 - Reporting suggests senior JAM members aware of kidnapping details
- ***Involvement of senior JAM members in kidnapping of Coalition national reflects degree of importance of these operations to JAM. Expect kidnapping attempts of MNF targets of opportunity to continue as JAM is pressured by ISF, CF operations.***

39

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNF-I DUSTWUN AND MISSING PERSONNEL

BBC News (b)(6)

Dubai Al-Arabiyah Television in Arabic 1215 GMT 05 JAN 07

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z01/UJUR
For display only to IIR

Outlook: Sunni Response to Saddam's Execution

- Sunni political leadership issuing mixed response
 - 1 Jan, VP Hashimi (IIP), President Talibani (KDP), Adnan Dulaymi (Tawafuq Front) issued joint statement stressing Iraqi unity; call to combat sectarian tensions
 - 31 Dec, Abd Jabbar Kubaysi (INA) stated execution was conducted to humiliate all Arabs and Muslims; placed blame on Iran for execution
 - 31 Dec, Salih Mutlaq (INFD) stated, "the aim of the execution was to divide Iraqis and to foment sectarian conflict among them. Continuing the political process with those who lead the country will lead nowhere."
 - 31 Dec, Khalaf Ulyan (NDC), questioned expediting of verdict, selected date of execution; placed blame on CF, Israel and Iran
- Sunni Resistance using as rallying cry, theme of unifying Iraqis to combat CF
 - 1 Jan, Izzat al-Duri, NBP leader, called for escalation of attacks against CF, called for unifying mujahidin, nationalists, pan-Arabs, and Islamists to work together; pool resources, capabilities in establishment of jihad and resistance front
 - 31 Dec, MUC spokesman, Dr Muhammad Bashar al-Faydi, blamed CF for decision to execute Saddam; called on Iraqis to preserve national unity
- Syrian Info Minister, Dr Muhsin Bilal stated Damascus, "believed the timing was not right, pictures shown were a violation of the most simple principles and international agreements"
- Arab League stated the events, "only exacerbated sectarian tensions...seemed as a revenge killing...hindrance to national reconciliation"

Assessment: Execution will not dramatically change Sunni Arab views of current political climate. While Sunni voice remains fragmented, events surrounding execution will intensify Sunni perceptions of Shi'a militia/Iranian influence in IG. Saddam's execution will be utilized by Resistance as source of motivation for recruitment, reinforce opposition to CF.

40

Sunni Political

1.

1.4c
- 2.
3. Xxx

Sunni Resistance

1. XXX
2. XXX
3. XXX

Sunni Extremist

1. XXX
2. XXX
3. XXX

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170106

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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41

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170107

Area of Interest Update

- Iranian reformists critical of policy; Hamas to double militia; Somalis protest against Ethiopians
 - Iranian parliamentary reformist faction voiced criticism of government's nuclear policy in press
 - Claimed two UN resolutions directed against Iran in 18 months illustrates flawed foreign policy
 - Threatened impeachment of Foreign Minister Mottaki
 - Asserted "only way to pass the crisis is to build confidence... holding a holocaust conference and financing Hamas creates mistrust and tension"
 - Hamas vowed to double its armed force to 12,000 men after President Abbas declared it illegal
 - Current power struggle between Hamas, Fatah centers around control of security forces
 - Abbas has demanded militia integration into existing security structures
 - Hundreds of Somalis protested against Ethiopian presence, gov't disarmament program in Mogadishu
 - Ethiopian troops allegedly exchanged fire w/ protesters



1.4c


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
Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: "Outrage over killing of Gaza boys"

BBC News, 11 Dec: "Arab League hopes for Beirut deal"

OSC (b)(6) "Kiriyyenko Stresses Iran's 'inalienable right' to develop peaceful nuclear activities"






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z0170107
For display only to IRO

JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

- JAM weapons reportedly transported from Kirkuk to Mosul and Tal' Afar areas, early Jan
 - Allegedly transported by cargo vehicles with government license plates
 - Sent to Quwair Base, provided to Tal'Afar Shi'a fighters or unspecified Mosul terrorists
 - Tal Afar population is approximately 10% Shi'a
- JAM rogue commander Abu Dura may have been informed of assassination plot
 - Assassins possibly include Dura's colleagues
 - Dura allegedly reluctant to return to Sadr City



Assessment: JAM activity in Mosul and Tal' Afar areas uncommon; weapons possibly intended to counter potential threats to small Shi'a population or Kurdish expansion activities. Assassination plot would indicate possible fractures between Abu Dura and his followers; reluctance to return to Sadr City probably reflects concern of CF targeting during expected operations.

45

SOURCES:

1.4c

4JAN, JAM weapons transported
6JAN, Abu Dura warned assassination plot.

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170107

Current Situation

- **VBIED in Baghdad**
 - **VBIED detonated in Doura**
 - Victims all civilian, no CF/ISF in area
 - Post blast analysis found ball bearings, indicating anti-personnel design
 - Likely inadvertent detonation; device detonated in Sunni neighborhood, no large crowds in vicinity
 - VBIED likely prepared for final movement to planned target
 - **VBIED attack rates below recent historical trend**
 - December total 27 VBIEDs, down from 4 month average of 33
 - First week in January produced 4 VBIED attacks
 - Down from December weekly average of 9
 - Unit analysis indicates reduction likely due to extremist reconstitution
 - **No attack claims; methodology implicates AQI, Sunni extremists**
- ***Sunni extremists continue high profile attack efforts to inflame sectarian violence, undermine security in Baghdad. Expect high profile attacks against Shi'a civilians in mixed areas of Baghdad as part of ongoing Sunni response to Shi'a militia operations.***

46



SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

SIGACT

1.4a

Trends Data



SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170107
For display only to IRQ

Outlook: Emerging Islamic State of Iraq IO Theme

- Emerging AQI-led Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) IO theme: Defending Sunni from Shi'a, Iranian threats
 - 17 November, ISI web posting raised specter of Iranian threat

1.4b, 1.4d
 - 28 November, ISI promised to cleanse Baghdad of Shi'a & Shi'a militias
 - 17 December, ISI audio message called on Sunni to travel to Baghdad to defend capital from Shi'a domination
 - Compared battle for Baghdad to struggle against "Shi'a Rejectionists"
 - 28 December, ISI statement titled "Take Heed"
 - Warned of future Shi'a attacks in public venues: marketplaces, mosques

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

47

Approved for Release

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170107

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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48

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170108

Area of Interest Update

- December Iranian Elections
 - Two nationwide elections took place on 15 Dec: Assembly of Experts; City and Village Councils
 - 61% voter turnout out of 46.5 million eligible voters, much higher than previous years
 - Election for 4th Assembly of Experts
 - Assembly of Experts established in 1983; in charge of supervising, dismissing and electing Iranian Supreme Leader
 - Composed of 86 members, 8 year terms (changed to 10 years this term)
 - Moderate former President Rafsanjani beat hard-line candidate associated with Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah Yazdi
 - Rafsanjani received nearly twice as many votes as Yazdi
 - Wide support for moderate conservatives: 65 moderate candidates won seats out of 86
 - Rafsanjani has advocated more pragmatic international approach, criticized Ahmadinejad's nuclear policy
 - City and Village Council Elections
 - Popular election of councils, councils then select mayors
 - Candidates aligned with Ahmadinejad won low % of seats nationwide
 - Reformists won robust victory in local elections, including major cities of Tehran, Shiraz
- *Election results will have little immediate effect. Serves to manifest public dissatisfaction with Conservative faction's failure to deliver economic promises, confrontational foreign policy that has brought international sanctions.*



Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani


49

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: "Outrage over killing of Gaza boys"

BBC News, 11 Dec: "Arab League hopes for Beirut deal"

OSD (b)(6) "Kiriyyenko Stresses Iran's 'inalienable right' to develop peaceful nuclear activities"



SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170105

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:

- Sadr CoR bloc leader, Nasar al-Rubai denied Sadrists demanded Saddam's execution before return to IG
 - Stated execution has nothing to do with Sadrists return to parliament, IG
 - Sadrists stipulated timetable for CF withdrawal required for end of boycott
- Sadrists reiterate negative comments about PM Maliki; warning about Sistani's succession
 - 'PM Maliki only does what the occupier orders'
 - 'We will not allow [Sistani's] successor to be Seyed al-Hakim, we will oppose that with all available means'
 - Hakim uncle of SCIRI Chairman Aziz al-Hakim
 - Against division of Iraq among Kurds, Shi'a, Sunnis
 - 'We will oppose with force anyone who pursues this objective, including Iran'
- 7 Jan, Press reported Sadr and Sistani met in Najaf to discuss 'means to enhance security, stability in Iraq'



1.4c

51

SOURCES:

OpenSource: Militias to launch 'Large-Scale Attack' on Eastern Baghdad; 50 Bodies Found, 5Jan

OpenSource: BBC Monitoring: Iraq Briefing 0400, 5Jan

1.4c 4JAN, JAM weapons reportedly transported from Kirkuk to Mosul area

OpenSource: Maliki's office dismisses AMS Statement , 5Jan

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170103

- **VBIED attacks south of Baghdad Current Situation**
 - **VBIEDs in Hilla, Mahmudiya**
 - **Hilla attack**
 - Targeted civilians in Revolutionary Public Market, no CF/ISF in vicinity
 - » 2nd VBIED attempt on market in last 30 days
 - VBIED did not detonate fully, UXO recovered by IA EOD, civil defense
 - Partial detonation may indicate poor construction methods
 - **Mahmudiya attack**
 - Minivan reported as possible VBIED, EOD planned controlled detonation
 - Device prematurely detonated causing EOD casualties
 - Trigger method unknown, or if intended to target responders
 - **VBIEDs uncommon in Hilla, Mahmudiya**
 - Both cities average less than 1 per month; Mahmudiya has seen surge in last 2 months
 - Mahmudiya total of 5 VBIEDs in last 2 months
 - **Possibly indicates increased VBIED facilitation in southern AQI belt**
 - Increased pressure from CF, result of ongoing security operations in Baghdad
 - Operation Security Forever commenced 1 January in select areas
 - Increased pressure from Shi'a militants, resulting in less permissive operating environment
- ***Sunni extremist networks possibly utilizing HP facilitation from more permissive environments outside Baghdad. Groups will likely reconstitute and resume operations within capital as security conditions permit.***

52

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:


SIGACT

SIGACT

1.4a

Trends Data

CIOC Information Paper 070103 Al-Qai'da in Iraq Response to Phase III of the Baghdad Security Plan



SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170104

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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54

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170109

Area of Interest Update

- Khamenei adamant nuclear work will continue; Lebanese opposition to escalate protests; Sudanese Pres indicates possible compromise
 - Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei asserted nuclear program will continue despite international pressure
 - Claimed program represents native achievement, source of honor for Iran and Islamic world
 - Stated “Muslim countries should know this power belongs to them”
 - Lebanese opposition groups back main labor union calls for protest against proposed economic reforms
 - Economic initiative intended to improve prospects for international investment prior to “Paris 3 conference”
 - Main labor union opposes tax increases, privatization
 - Sit-in protest to begin today in front of gov’t buildings
 - Sudanese Pres al-Bashir indicated conciliatory tone toward UN; possible compromise for peacekeepers
 - Indicated willingness to accept phased deployment of hybrid African/non-African UN stability force
 - Hundreds of Sudanese reportedly demonstrated against proposed UN presence in Darfur
- *Khamenei seeking to rally pan-Islamic support for Iranian nuclear program.*




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
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OSD (b)(6) “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”






SECRET//REL TO USA//MCF//20170109
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

- Media and atmospheric reporting indicates recruitment drive by JAM in Sadr City
 - Reporting suggests possible forced recruitment
 - One male from each household allegedly required to serve provided not affiliated with other political groups
- Reports indicate Sadr possibly authorizing new 'Hizballah in Iraq' organization, early Jan
 - Covert organization would allegedly be formed within JAM
 - Select JAM members eager to join organization but skeptical it had Sadr's blessing
- Iraqi news website claiming agreement reached for Sadrists to rejoin Gol



Recent JAM Activity

Sadr City

Assessment: Recruitment efforts reflect possible attempt to bolster JAM presence in Sadr City prior to expected CF operations. Rumors of Sadr authorizing new organization possibly stem from internal concern over reported plan to disband JAM.

58

SOURCES:

IQAFT IP: Compulsory service in JAM, 8Jan

IOTF News Summary, 8Jan

1.4c

8JAN, JAM learns Sadr authorized new organization

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170105

Current Situation

- **SVBIED attack near Ramadi**
 - **SVBIED targeted IP station**
 - Reportedly caused multiple IP casualties
 - Targeted IP checkpoint on ASR Mobile
 - First SVBIED of 2007
 - **Nationwide SVBIED attacks down over last month**
 - No SVBIEDs nationwide last week, first SVBIED since 29 December
 - First week of no SVBIEDs on record
 - December total of 30 down from 2006 monthly average of 31
 - **Baghdad SVBIED attacks down significantly**
 - *No suicide attacks of any type in capital since 22 December, 17 days total*
 - 30 December possible SVBIED later proven to be VBIED
 - Longest suicide attack lull in Baghdad on record
 - December total of 7 down from 2006 monthly average of 8
 - **Suicide attacks down for various reasons**
 - ISF, CF operations constraining flow of FF at Syrian border
 - Hajj temporarily drawing many religious extremists to religious pursuits
 - Weather affecting transit time of FF over northern facilitation routes
- ***Sunni extremist methodology and targeting remain consistent in spite of decreased number of suicide attacks. Expect increased attack rate as pilgrims return from Hajj, facilitation networks adapt to constraints.***

59

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

SIGACT 1.4a

Trends Data

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z0170109 For display only to Iraq		
CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 30 December 2006 – 5 January 2007
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein hanged 30 December; Ba'ath Party urges Iraqis to "strike without mercy" at US occupiers and Shi'ite 1.4b, 1.4d New Ba'ath Party warns of Iranian imperialism Sadrists indicate return to government imminent
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Sectarian incidents: 155; down 18% previous week National Sectarian casualties: 487; down 20% National executions: 219 KIA; down 26% Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 133; up 4% Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 382; down 19% Baghdad executions: 195 KIA; down 10%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JAM have been distributing IEDs, large amounts of explosives, remote controls, large ordnance in Baghdad NBP and AQI, 1920s Rev Bde and AQI meet to discuss increased cooperation, coordination of attacks against CF
Population movements	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internally displaced families in Iraq: IOM: 57,166; MoDM: 55,003 In Baghdad JAM and Sunni groups forcing population movements; Sunni enclaves developing in Adhamiyah, Mansour and Masafee
Assessment: Overall situation remains serious. Despite threats and rhetoric, Saddam's execution unlikely to ignite increased levels of violence. Sunni Resistance exploit fear of Shi'a dominance, Iranian influence to maintain support; some tactical cooperation with AQI occurring in northern Iraq. JAM's defensive posture in Baghdad is in expectation of ISF/CF operations. While Sadr likely using JAM as bargaining chip to rejoin politics, JAM unlikely to disband.		

60

Mobilization

1.4c

JAM transition to active militant posture in Southern Salah Ad Din

Spokesman states negotiations between IG, Sadrists have reached 'advanced stage'

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170109

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

61

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170111

Area of Interest Update

- Israeli PM meets Chinese leaders; Hamas leader acknowledges Israel; Darfur ceasefire agreement
 - Israeli PM Olmert discussed Iranian nuclear issue with Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao
 - Olmert stated “China made it absolutely clear that it opposes Iran going nuclear”
 - 23 December Security Council resolution imposed 60-day deadline on Iran to cease enrichment activity
 - Iran supplies 12% of Chinese crude oil imports
 - Hamas leader Meshaal acknowledged Israeli existence during press interview in Damascus
 - Meshaal stated Israel a “reality,” claimed “formal recognition” possible after Palestinian state established
 - Asserted support for Arab vision of Palestinian state including Gaza, W. Bank, E. Jerusalem, right of return
 - Sudanese gov’t, Darfur rebels agreed to ceasefire
 - Agreement includes 60-day cessation of hostilities, AU/UN-sponsored peace summit
- *Hamas seeking to portray minimum concessions necessary to end economic sanctions without alienating base.*




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
Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC (b)(6) “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z0170111
for display only to INQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadr reportedly decided not to disband JAM
 - Decision followed meeting with Sistani on 7 Jan
 - Recent arrests of JAM members in Baghdad has intimidated colleagues
 - Select JAM members believe CF can identify individuals by their clothes
 - Nervous to use certain roads in fear of being arrested by CF
 - JAM members plan, organize mortar attacks against CF in Al-Zaharaa mosque, Jihad
 - Mortars fired from behind mosque at LSA Slayer
 - JAM member reportedly Head of security for mosque



1.4c

65

SOURCES:

1.4c JAM members plan and organize attacks against CF in al-zaharaa mosque, 8Jan
1.4c 10JAN, Recent arrest of JAM members results in colleagues worrying over their own safety
1.4c 10JAN, Sadr not disbanding JAM

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170111

Current Situation

- **EFPs Recovered in MND-N**
 - 3rd EFP event in MND-N in last 2 weeks
 - 10 JAN – 7 Array EFP F/C on ASR Cheyenne in Kirkuk Province
 - Discovered based on information received from informant tip to CF
 - 08 JAN – 10 Array EFP F/C in Kirkuk
 - Discovered based on informant tip to ISF
 - 31 DEC – 4 Array EFP detonated on Route Dover south of Baqubah
 - Caused several CF casualties
 - EFP incidents in MND-N higher this week
 - 2 EFP incidents this week; higher than weekly average of less than 1
 - EFP incidents down nationwide last week
 - 7 events last week; down 5 from ten week average of 12
 - EFPs attributable to Shi'a militias
 - Recent EFP events in Kirkuk consistent with MND-B, MND-SE JAM TTPs; coincide with JAM expansion into area
 - [redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
- *Use of sophisticated EFP arrays in MND-N indicates proliferation by mainstream JAM or closely associated elements. Actionable informant tip to ISF on 8 January suggests increased public trust of ISF in Kirkuk.*

66

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

SIGACTS: [redacted] 1.4a [redacted] 8170,
[redacted] 1.4a

CIDNE Trends Data

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170111
SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170111
For display only to Iraq

Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI propaganda volume up 222 to 229
 - Announced end of “Harshness” campaign; claimed free reign in Mosul and Ba’qubah; claimed attacks against “Safawi gangs” in Baghdad in defense of Sunnis forced out
 - Denounced PM Maliki’s security plan; stated plan aims to “annihilate the Sunnis”
- AS propaganda volume up 8 to 25
 - Claimed joint attack with IAI on Iraqi Army checkpoint south of Balad
- IAI propaganda volume up 17 to 53
 - Released audio urging Islamists and Nationalists to unite against “Safawis”
 - (b)(6)
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume up 32 to 117

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume up 3 to 14
 - Ba’ath Party called on T&FF, Resistance groups to avenge Saddam, attack MNF, 4b, 1, 4d
 - Amuriyah Forces Command declared killing Saddam a sign of weakness and stupidity; vowed retaliation against CF for martyrdom of Saddam

Assessment: AQI propaganda highlights Baghdad sectarian conflict, attempting to instill Sunni fear of Iran-sponsored IG and militant aggression, portray AQI operations in defense of Sunni populace. Safawi references pervasive; unity and collective goals evident as underlying themes across extremist/resistance media.

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170111

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c


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68

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170112
For display only to IRO

Area of Interest Update

- Iranian officials criticize recent security operation in Irbil; Chinese oil firm plans Iran investment
 - Iranian Consul for Irbil commented to press on 11 Jan MNF operation in Irbil
 - Stated MNF intends to create more insecure climate for activities of Iran and Syria in Baghdad and Basra
 - Asserted consulate's activities in Irbil engage in helping Iraqi Kurds with "health, hygiene and social problems"
 - Member of Iranian Parliament condemned Irbil detainments as counter to diplomatic norms
 - Called operation attempt to infuriate Iran, prompt illogical response
 - Stated operation indicative of Coalition Forces "utmost cruelty, incapability and meanness"
 - Chinese state-run oil firm, CNOOC, planning \$16 billion USD investment in Iranian natural gas field
 - Proposed investment to develop northern Pars gas field
 - Chinese FM spokesman defended proposed deal from international criticism; claimed separate from sanctions



Iran-Iraq Border

1.4c

69


Sources:


Reuters, 11 Jan 07, US Forces Raid Iranian Office in Iraq: Tehran

OSC (b)(6) Iranian Consul in Arbil Talks to Agency About US Raid on Consulate

OSC Iranian Lawmaker Urges Rational Response to US Consulate Raid

BBC, 11 Jan 07, China Defends Iran Gas Deal Talks






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170112
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadrists denounce deployment of more US troops to Iraq
 - ‘Increasing the number of foreign forces will make things more complicated’
 - ‘Giving PM Maliki more power and setting a CF withdrawal timetable bound to solve problems’
 - Senior Sadrist official, Baha al-Araji, denied bloc will return to government before CF withdrawal timetable demand is met
 - Sadrists reportedly deny imposing compulsory conscription in Sadr City; concerned over CF targeting
 - Multiple reports of forced JAM recruitment
 - Sadr allegedly asked Sistani to intervene to prevent his supporters from being targeted



Recent JAM Activity

Sadr City

Assessment: *Sadrist denouncement of CF force increase, calls for greater IG power were anticipated. US Presidents’ announcement may cause Sadr to harden position on CF withdrawal timetable requirement. Denial of compulsory conscription part of concerted effort to deflect attention away from JAM activity.*

72

SOURCES:

IOTF News summary, 11Jan

OpenSource, 11Jan, AMS, Al-Sadr Trend Denounce Deployment of More troops

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For display only to IIR

Current Situation


- **SVEST Attack in MNF-W**
 - **10 JAN: SVEST attack targeted IA TCP near Khalidiyah (IVO Ramadi)**
 - Unit reporting indicates attacker was 13 year-old boy
 - Boy had been loitering IVO TCP days prior, asked for water to gain access
 - Attack resulted in several IA casualties
 - SAF attack originating from mosque simultaneously targeted nearby IA OP
 - **Second adolescent suicide attack in MNF-W in recent months**
 - **25 NOV 06: SVBIED reportedly driven by 13 year-old boy in Mudiq (IVO Ramadi)**
 - Vehicle stopped due to erratic driving, detonated as CF approached
 - Resulted in several CF casualties, multiple civilian casualties
 - **Recent reporting indicates insurgents recruiting children**
 - Targeting young children aged 10-14 to conduct basic tasks against MNF
 - i.e. surveillance, detonation of IEDs, SAF, suicide attacks
 - Children may also be used to identify MNF patrols, locations
 - Adolescents may be used to fill gap due to lack of FF available
- ***Poor economy, culture of violence fosters recruitment of adolescent males in MNF-W, particularly if family lacks basic necessities, employment. Recruitment drive indicates possible shift responding to reduced FF availability, CF/ISF effectiveness in identifying traditional extremist TTPs.***

73

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c



Data represents reporting from CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
Data time period: 190001DEC06 – 252400DEC06

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170112

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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75

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170114~~


Area of Interest Update


- Palestinian leaders call for unity; Somali gov't declares martial law; EU calls for Darfur force
 - PM Haniya of Hamas urged national unity agreement during televised speech
 - Pres Abbas of Fatah made similar appeal on 11 Jan
 - Government workers ended strike over unpaid wages after assurance of payment by Arab states
 - Somali parliament approved plan by PM to declare three months of martial law
 - Government attempting to assert authority over clan disputes, re-emerging warlords
 - Martial law allows president to issue decrees, ban unlawful demonstrations, stop propaganda
 - EU representative for Sudan appealed for ceasefire, called for long-term peacekeepers
 - Stated rebels need to reach unified position
 - Claimed Sudanese government has created forces that it can no longer control in Darfur region
- *Influx of illegal funding to Hamas government has alleviated pressure, helped end strike; expect Hamas to resist concessions to Fatah during unity negotiations.*



76

Sources:






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170114
For display only to IRG

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadrists allegedly formed cell to assassinate Samawah officials, mid-Jan
 - Officials include IA, government officers and possibly Muthanna provincial governor
 - Sadrist CoR member commented on status of talks with IG
 - Claimed CoR speaker Mashhadani agreed to present draft bill for CF withdrawal timeline
 - Said Sadrist bloc had 'other conditions being discussed with the government'
 - Stressed Sadrists 'part of the political process'
 - Three Sunni newspapers reportedly ceased publication in Baghdad after JAM threats
 - Newspapers were respectively affiliated with the Iraqi Islamic Party, Muslim Ulema Council, and Tawafuq leader Adnan al-Dulaymi's party



Assessment: Muthanna PDOP Colonel Ali likely among those targeted for assassination due to his hard line stance during Samawah IP's late-December clashes with JAM. Sadrist likely exaggerating reported deal on coalition timeline. JAM threats against Sunni-affiliated newspapers part of campaign to intimidate Sunni population.

79

SOURCES:

1.4c Sadrists allegedly form cell to assassinate Samawah officials,
12Jan
OpenSource, 13Jan, Sadr Trend Official Cited on Talks to return to cabinet, parliament
OpenSource, 3 Sunni newspapers cease publication, 13Jan

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170114

Current Situation

- **12 Jan complex attack in Hit**
 - Coordinated attack targeted ISF, CF throughout Hit
 - IP station attacked with 10 RPGs, heavy SAF
 - At least 6 CF/ISF positions sustained concurrent attacks
 - Reported heavy, sustained SAF
 - Rotary wing CAS asset reported SAFIRE while supporting TIC
 - Attacks ineffective; 13 AIF KIA, 7 WIA
 - Other attacks nearby
 - Earlier attack targeted Camp Hit with 2 X 107mm rockets
 - SVBIED targeted Zuwayyah IP checkpoint (17km SE of Hit)
 - Locations, methodology implicate AQI-affiliated cells operating IVO Hit
 - Freedom of movement, FF facilitation likely impaired due to CF/ISF operations
 - LOC through Hit crucial to ERV facilitation networks
 - Aim to intimidate, discredit ISF, bolster extremist recruitment
 - Reporting has indicated FF presence operating in the area
- ***Multiple, near simultaneous attacks on ISF, CF indicate concerted effort by AQI-affiliated elements to discourage growth of locally-manned, effective ISF in Hit. Expect continued extremist targeting of ISF/CF in western ERV to enable freedom of operation along critical FF facilitation route.***

80

SCRIPT:



Notes & Sources:

1.4c

SIGACTS

1.4a

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Outlook: Sunni Extremist Collaboration Increasing

- **Sunni extremists view Baghdad as vital battleground in sectarian conflict**
 - Mid-Nov 06, ISI statement promises to cleanse Baghdad of Shi'a and Shi'a militias
 - Mid-Dec 06, AQI-led ISI statement calls on Sunnis to "rescue the captive Baghdad"
 - End-Dec 06, IAI exploits similar themes in a public release
- **Sunni extremists discuss greater cooperation due to JAM successes**
 - Late Dec 06, IAI, 1920 Rev Bde, and other Sunni groups plan joint anti-Shi'a campaign in Baghdad
 - Early Jan 07, AQI, IAI, MA and 1920 Rev Bde discuss joint response to Shi'a attacks in neighborhood of Ghazaliya

Sunni extremist groups see Baghdad as centerpiece to future goals and must demonstrate ability to "defend the faithful" in the capital to remain relevant. Sunni extremists often work together at the tactical level, but will likely collaborate at the operational level in the near-term to counter JAM territorial gains.

81

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170114

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170115

Area of Interest Update

- Iran demands release of "diplomats;" Chavez, Ahmadinejad announce joint anti-US fund
 - Iranian FM spokesman, Hosseini, rejected MNF statement that detained Iranians connected to IRGC
 - "What the Americans claim is incorrect. They want to create a climate that justifies their illegal action"
 - "Americans want to radicalize the atmosphere in Iraq to justify their occupation, but we will act wisely"
 - Stated all detained were doing "consular work," called for immediate release, compensation for damages
 - Ahmadinejad, Chavez announced joint anti-US fund for projects to free countries from "US domination"
 - Pledged 2 billion USD for governments attempting to "liberate themselves from US imperialism"
 - Also called for further OPEC production cuts to reverse falling price of crude; down 14% since 1 Jan
 - Ahmadinejad touring Latin America, scheduled to meet leaders of Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia



Iranian Pres during visit to
conversion facility

1.4c


83

Sources:

(b)(6)

14 Jan 07, Iran Demands US Releases Captives


14 Jan 07, Chavez and Iran Unveil Anti-US Fund



SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z0170115
For display only to INQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadr reportedly called on JAM to practice self-restraint, avoid military confrontation with CF
 - JAM meetings being held for recruitment during the Ashura holiday – 21 Jan, Najaf
 - JAM will reportedly use Sahab al-Amiri's death as focal point for recruitment effort
 - Will use Ashura holiday as cover for meetings
 - Sadrist CoR representative, Baha al-A'raji, commented on recent talks over return to IG
 - Noted 'good news' that some parties accepted Sadrists' demands
 - Said demands are not 'exclusive' to the Sadr bloc, these demands are 'popular ones'



Assessment: Sadr's call for restraint likely applies only to anti-CF activities, sectarian operations targeting Sunnis likely to continue. Recruiting effort likely reflects attempts to bolster JAM morale, maintain capability. Despite continued lack of agreement, repeated theme of 'progress' in talks with IG intended to emphasize Sadr's political influence, deflect attention away from JAM.

85

SOURCES:

1.4c 11Jan, Mahdi Militia meetings in Najaf
OpenSource, 3 Sunni newspapers cease publication, 13Jan

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170115

Current Situation

- **January suicide attacks**
 - Suicide attacks on pace to equal lowest level in over 2 years
 - 7 suicide attacks reported nationwide as of 15 January
 - 21% December total of 34
 - 2006 average monthly suicide attacks: 38 per month
 - Primary target remains ISF
 - Statistically, twice as many attacks target ISF as CF
 - No Baghdad suicide attacks thus far in 2007
 - Longest period without suicide attacks in capital on record
 - SVBIED remains preferred suicide attack method
 - Since 1 June, over 80% of suicide attacks have been SVBIEDs
 - Suicide attack trends down for various reasons
 - Continued ISF, CF operations constraining flow of FF
 - CF, ISF continue affecting freedom of maneuver for FF networks through historical FF LOCs
 - Seasonal weather
 - 1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

86



SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170116

Outlook: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

- National Incidents: 142; down 8% previous week
 - 72 targeted Shi'a, 42 Sunni, and 28 unattributed
 - Total casualties: 304 killed, 46 injured; down 28% from previous week
- National Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 135 incidents; down 6%
 - 289 killed; up 32% from previous week
 - Ethno-Sectarian Executions account for 83% of total casualties; 95% of deaths
 - Daily average of 20; elevated from pre-Golden Mosque baseline of 3
- Baghdad Incidents: 115; down 14% from previous week
 - 71 targeted Shi'a; 42 Sunni; 2 unattributed
 - Total casualties: 246 killed, 14 injured; down 32% from previous week
- Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions:
 - 110 incidents, down 13% from previous week
 - 242 killed; up 24% from previous week



Assessment: Iraqi and CF security operations and reduced HP attacks led to reduced sectarian casualties. Increase in execution casualties reflects predicted increase of death squad activity following Eid holiday lull. Expect levels of ethno-sectarian violence to remain steady over the next week as security operations continue.

87

Source: CIDNE (includes NJOC)

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFE//20170115

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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88

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170116

Area of Interest Update

- Iran reportedly sends message to Saudis, vows expanded enrichment; Kenya detains Islamists
 - Iranian nuclear negotiator reportedly delivered letter from Khamenei, Ahmadinejad to Saudi King
 - Saudi official stated letter part of goodwill message to “help bring [Western, Iranian] opinions together”
 - Larijani considered moderate conservative, rival to Ahmadinejad; advocates more pragmatic approach
 - Iran announced implementation of plan for industrial-scale uranium enrichment
 - Plan includes installation of 3,000 centrifuges
 - 3,000 fully functioning centrifuges could produce sufficient uranium for weapon within one year
 - Successful implementation of plan would likely require months to build proper infrastructure
 - Kenya announced detainment of Islamists, jihadists
 - At least 10 Islamist officials, foreign fighters detained near Somali border
- *Letter suggests moderates gaining voice in foreign policy; will portray successful industrial enrichment as irreversible achievement of full fuel cycle.*



89


Sources:


Reuters, 15 Jan 07, Iran Asks Saudi Arabia to Ease Tension with US

OSC (b)(6) Iran: 'Informed Source' Denies Larijani Took Khamenei Letter to Saudi Leaders

Reuters, 15 Jan 07, Iran Says Pressing Ahead with Expanded Atomic Plan

OSC (b)(6) Kenya Reportedly Arrests 'Top' Islamic Courts Leader, Other Foreign Nationals






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//126170116
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent Reporting
 - Sadrist CoR members planning for end of suspension, delegation abroad
 - Sadrist delegation reportedly planned for neighboring countries following return to IG
 - Select Sadrist CoR members reportedly favored return to IG in mid-January
 - Sadrists will reportedly not resist potential ministerial changes by PM
- 14 Jan, Murtada al-Bahadli attempting to avoid capture, flee via BIAP, probably to Syria
 - Battalion commander, brother of former Baghdad JAM commander, Mustafah al-Bahadli
 - Allegedly made careful plans to avoid capture:
 - Changed itinerary several times, used false name, asked family to call him by pseudonym
 - Kept associates abreast of his movement



Assessment: Plan for regional trip suggests Sadrists believe return to government imminent; Sadr likely resigned to ministerial changes, believes he will have say in selection of replacements. Detainment of JAM leaders continues to create paranoia; Murtadah's example highlights extensive efforts to avoid capture; Mustafah likely escaped.

92

SOURCES:

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170116

Current Situation

- **Continued targeting of ISF in Anbar**
 - ISF buses hit by IED on ASR Long Island (48 km S of Ramadi)
 - Total of 3 buses struck, 1 bus severed in half
 - Buses transporting 2/7 IA for leave
 - Multiple casualties
 - Targeting of ISF in MNF-W increased through 2006
 - Attacks increased steadily from 35 in JAN 06 to 195 in DEC 06
 - This month on pace to be lower than DEC 06 high
 - 72 Attacks through 14 JAN
 - SAF weapon of choice against ISF in 2006
 - SAF accounted for 649 of 1426 attacks in 2006; 46% of ISF attacks
 - Trend continues this month with SAF accounting for 39 of 72 attacks
 - Sunni extremist/AQI targeting of ISF continues escalating due to:
 - Increased numbers of ISF provide larger footprint for opportunistic attacks
 - ISF continuing to affect freedom of maneuver for FF networks
 - Extremist attempting to intimidate ISF, undermine professional confidence
 - Attempts may be backfiring, record number in Anbar volunteering for ISF
- ***Extremist TTPs, escalating attack trend have remained consistent into new year. Expect attacks targeting ISF to continue to increase as Iraqis accept greater responsibility for Anbar's security.***

93

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

CIDNE Trends Data

Open Sources

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170115 For display only to IRQ		
CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 6 - 12 January 2007
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PM Maliki's public announcement of holding perpetrators accountable regardless of political or sectarian affiliation, promotion of Iraqi Armed Forces to provide security; actions will be final judge
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Sectarian incidents: 142; down 8% previous week National Sectarian casualties: 350; down 28% National executions: 289 KIA; up 32% Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 115; down 14% Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 260; down 32% Baghdad executions: 242 KIA; up 24%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JAM reportedly requiring compulsory service for 15-45 year old males in Sadr City; previous reports of recruiting young men in Sadr City, Samaawa; offering \$100 to join, \$500 to attack CF within Sadr City
Population movements	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internally displaced families in Iraq: IOM: 58,495 (up 1,329); MoDM: 55,003; increase of Sunni IDPs in Anbar following Baghdad fighting Flyers distributed in Hayy al-Amil for Shi'a to leave; known sectarian fault line between Sunni, Shi'a
Assessment: Overall situation remains serious, but sectarian violence casualties declined for third week despite increase in execution deaths. Increased security presence, announcement of plan in Baghdad pushing high profile attacks away from Baghdad to LOCs. Expect executions to remain primary method of attack within mixed areas.		
94		

1.4c	"Al-Maliki Addresses Army on Saddam Execution, Baghdad Security Plan, Militias"
Ethno-Sectarian Weekly Slide	
1.4c	
1.4c	"Compulsory Service in JAM"
1.4c	
7 Jan IOM Report	
1.4c	"Al-Qaeda Distributing Leaflets in Hayy al-'Amil"

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170116

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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95

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170117~~

Area of Interest Update

- Fatah accuses Hamas of assassination plan; Saudi calls for oil prudence; Darfur rebels claim air attacks
 - Fatah accused Hamas of plotting to kill senior officials using tunnels packed with explosives in Gaza
 - Fatah spokesman stated five tunnels discovered under homes, roads frequented by key leaders including Abbas
 - Hamas dismissed accusation, claimed tunnels intended to defend against Israeli incursions
 - Saudi Oil Minister stated no need for emergency OPEC meeting, claimed current production cuts sufficient
 - OPEC cut 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) of output in Nov, agreed last month for further 500k bpd on 1 Feb
 - Venezuela, Iran pushing for additional 500k bpd reduction
 - Oil currently at \$51.35 per barrel, 19-month low; below \$60 per barrel price favored by OPEC
 - Rebel groups claimed Sudanese military planes bombed villages in North Darfur despite truce
 - Sudanese Army spokesman denied claim



AN-26: used as bomber by Sudanese Air Force

1.4c

96


Sources:


BBC, 16 Jan 07, Hamas 'Planned to Murder Abbas'

Reuters, 16 Jan 07, Poll Shows Fatah would Defeat Hamas in Elections

Reuters, 16 Jan 07, Saudi Says No Need to Panic Over Oil Price Drop

Reuters, 16 Jan 07, Darfur Rebels Say Government Bombs Area Despite Truce






SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//ZD170117
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - JAM reportedly moving senior personnel out of Sadr City to prevent arrests
 - Allegedly negotiating freeze of activity to stop arrests
 - Iraqi TV reported Sadrists will respond 'flexibly' to implementation of new Baghdad security plan
 - JAM not to resist military units entering Sadr City
 - Source claims there are guarantees with IG to release any JAM member arrested if no weapons present
 - Reported lack of control, organization within Basrah JAM due to recent arrests, dismissals
 - JAM fear being captured by British forces
 - Each element reportedly operating independently
 - Basrah JAM members allegedly plan increase of attacks to improve morale



Recent JAM Activity

Assessment: *Sadrist attempts to cooperate with security plan part of effort to avoid further leadership arrests, confrontation with CF; possibly component of return to government. Basrah JAM, similar to Baghdad JAM, increasingly fearful of capture, suffering from poor morale and organization.*

99

SOURCES:

1.4c

15Jan, Shi'a militia organization dismissing current leadership

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170117

Current Situation

- **High Profile Attacks in Baghdad**
 - **Multiple High Profile Events**
 - 1258 – VBIED detonated at busy intersection in Rusafa
 - 1330 – Complex attack targeted motorcycle market in Rusafa
 - Suicide motorcycle targeted civilians
 - 2nd Suicide motorcycle or VBIED targeted first responders
 - 1410 – SVEST targeted LNs on bus in Sadr City
 - 1636 – Complex attack at Al Mustansiya University
 - 2 x VBIEDs targeted students, faculty departing University
 - Possible SVEST targeted responders
 - Total civilian casualties: 22 local nationals KIA, 175 WIA
 - Attacks follow 25-day lull in Baghdad suicide operations
 - No claims, targeting and methodology implicates AQI
 - Targeted Shi'a dominated areas IVO Sadr City
 - Late December reporting indicated AQI intended to attack Al Mustansiya Univ.
 - Methodology may indicate impacted freedom of operation
 - Use of SVEST, motorcycles to facilitate movement; adapting to security
- ***AQI conducted high profile attacks to counter Shi'a militia action, demonstrate ability to defend Sunnis, undermine security efforts. Expect Shi'a militants to respond with increased operations against Sunni neighborhoods in fault line areas.***

100

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4b, 1.4d

Open Source Reporting – CNN, BBC

SIGACTS

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170117
For display only to IRQ

Outlook: Ayatollah Sistani's Dilemma

- Grand Ayatollah Sistani seeks to balance security, Shi'a unity
 - Urged SCIRI to contact Sadr directly to minimize friction
 - Repeatedly stressed support for PM Maliki; sympathizes with difficulties in reining in JAM and other extremists
 - Pressed Sadr to reach an understanding with Maliki
- Sistani, advisors, pessimistic about Iraq's future, prospects for Shi'a/Sunni co-existence
 - Sistani reportedly "saw no virtue" in the formation of "new blocs" such as the cross-sectarian moderate bloc
 - Some aides advocate enlisting neighboring states to ease Iraq's problems; others argue "foreigners" trying to partition Iraq
 - Sadr recently told Sistani US "colluding" with Sunnis, Shi'a vulnerable to Sunni attack if disarmed



(b)(6)

Approved for Release

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170117

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
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102

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170118


Area of Interest Update


- Oil Price Projection for 2007
 - US Dept of Energy, private investment firms project crude oil to vacillate around \$60 per barrel in '07
 - US DOE projects \$64.42 in '07 down from \$66.02 in '06
 - Wachovia Economics Group projects \$60.00 in 2007
 - Reasons for decline include:
 - Warmer winter weather
 - Average US heating expenditures expected to fall 8% this winter
 - Slowing US, global GDP growth
 - Lower risk premiums for 2007
 - Iran perceived less likely to cut off exports
 - Extreme weather expectations caused '06 over-price
- *Expect price of oil to begin increase after 1 Feb from ~\$51 to 2007 projection of ~\$60 per barrel.*



103

Sources:






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For display only to IIR

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Mid-Jan, reporting indicates Sadr only supports defensive JAM attacks on CF
 - Sadr insists his statement be attributed to OMS political committee
 - Indecision in Najaf reportedly hindering Sadrist decision making in Baghdad
 - Instructions not being passed to Sadrist representatives in Baghdad
 - JAM aim to control Basrah IP checkpoints
 - Basrah JAM brigade commander reportedly met with Basrah CoP to discuss plans
 - Allegedly seeks to use JAM members already in IP
 - Previously reported, Basrah JAM members plan to increase attacks to improve JAM morale



Assessment: *Sadr likely attempting to distance himself from statement to minimize backlash from JAM elements who want to undertake offensive action against CF. Lack of guidance from Sadr leadership likely to blame for recent inconsistent public messages regarding return to IG, use of force against MNF. JAM efforts to infiltrate Basrah IP likely part of overall attempt to increase JAM morale, freedom of movement by increasing activity.*

106

SOURCES:

1.4c	17 Jan, Sadr supports defensive, not offensive JAM attacks
1.4c	Indecision in Najaf hampers progress of Sadrist negotiations
	16 JAN, JAM aim to control Basrah checkpoints

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170119

Current Situation

- **High profile attacks throughout Iraq**
 - **VBIED in Sadr City**
 - VBIED targeted civilians near Mereidi Market
 - Multiple civilian casualties reported, wide open source coverage
 - **VBIED in Kirkuk**
 - VBIED targeted Quoria IP station
 - Device utilized commercial truck, assessed to contain approx. 2000lb HME
 - Driver reportedly fled scene prior to detonation
 - Multiple civilian casualties reported, also widely covered by international media
 - **No attack claims, attack locations, methodology implicate AQI, AS**
 - Kirkuk attacks attributable to AS based on targeting
 - Baghdad attacks reflect AQI surge effort following extended reconstitution, adaptation to security operations
 - Sadr City targeting intended to counter Shi'a activity, undermine faith in security
- ***Recent high profile attacks represent AQI, AS attempts to sustain ethno-sectarian pressure, support IO campaigns. Expect traditional extremist attacks cycles to resume in attempt to undermine public faith in security efforts, counter Shi'a militia operations.***

107

SCRIPT:


Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACTS:

1.4a

Open Sources

CNN, BBC, FOX



SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170118

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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109

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170119

Area of Interest Update

- Israel provides Abbas funds; IAEA suspends Iran technical aid; China destroys satellite
 - Israel transferred \$100 million of tax revenues directly to Palestinian President Abbas
 - Money, collected on behalf of Palestinians, withheld since Hamas won elections last year
 - Palestinian Authority unable to pay employees due to international financial boycott
 - IAEA official announced decision to halt technical aid for select Iranian projects
 - Projects judged to have potential military implications
 - Decision prompted by December UN resolution outlawing cooperation for Iranian nuclear projects
 - International media reported Chinese space test of kinetic anti-satellite system on 11 January
 - Ground-based MRBM used to kinetically kill aging Chinese weather satellite 537 miles above earth
 - Media sources asserted space debris could possibly interfere with civil, military satellite operations



1.4c


110


Sources:

BBC, 18 Jan 06, Israel Hands Abbas Frozen Funds

OSC (b)(6) IAEA Suspends Some Technical Aid to Iran

Reuters, 18 Jan 07, Concerns over China's Satellite-killer Test






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z0170119
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

1.4c, 1.4b, 1.4d

- JAM reportedly using schools as offices and safe houses, east Baghdad
 - JAM ordering school managers not to accept assistance from CF
 - Schools instructed to give JAM list of students, teachers listing sectarian affiliation
- Media reports JAM members lowering their profile, believe there will be CF 'onslaught' against them
 - Claim JAM members 'making passports, to leave,' fear they will 'lose everything if they fight'
 - Sadrist Baha al-Araji said efforts to marginalize the Sadrists 'are likely to fail'



1.4c

SOURCES:

New York Times, 17 Jan, Shiite Fighters arrested in crackdown

1.4c

Baghdad

JAM using schools as offices and safehouses in east

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170110

Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI propaganda volume up 67 to 296
 - Announced "Mujahideen Secrets" encryption software and tutorial
 - Claimed two attacks and extensive damage on CF base in Albu Sudah region; attack on CF barracks in Abu-Ghurayb region; Claimed 5 destroyed Abrams tanks
 - Claimed assassination of a Major General; NFI
- AS propaganda volume up 18 to 43
 - Claimed attack on CF post in Ramadi and Andalus
- IAI propaganda volume down 29 to 24
 - Announced website dedicated for distribution of video on CF soldier
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume down 61 to 56

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume up 79 to 93
 - Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance condemned Saddam's execution; Israel, America, and Iran "the Axis of Evil"
 - Rashidin Army claimed to storm CF Base in Yusufiyah; claimed extensive damage
 - 1920 BDE released 2006 harvest of operations; Claimed over 5000 operations

1.4c

114

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170118

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170120

Area of Interest Update

- Lebanese opposition to call general strike; Hamas demands release of funds; Yemen denies harboring al-Duri
 - Lebanese opposition to call general strike next week, two days prior to int'l donor conference
 - Siniora government hopeful for billions worth of aid pledges to rebuild economy, support leadership
 - Nasrallah promised "very big action" in coming days
 - Hamas demands release of remaining tax revenues withheld by Israel
 - Demand follows release of \$100 million to Abbas
 - \$500 million of tax revenues remain frozen by Israel as part of international financial boycott
 - Yemeni official denied allegations government is harboring Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri
 - Regional media websites reported former regime VP hiding in Yemen
- *Opposition attempting to raise doubt concerning Lebanese stability among potential donors, sabotage financial prospects for Siniora gov't.*




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
Sources:

Reuters, 19 Jan 07, Lebanon Opposition to Call General Strike

BBC, 19 Jan 07, Hamas Demands Release of Revenues

OSC (b)(6) Yemen Denies Harboring Former Iraqi Vice-President






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JAM Update

- Recent reporting:

- Sadrists react to arrest of Shaykh Abd-al-Hadi al-Darraj
 - OMS spokesperson warned US 'playing with fire,' these actions 'will not go peacefully'
 - Claimed massive demonstrations would be held after Friday prayers

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c



- 18 Jan, Sadr comments on relationship with PM Maliki, sets terms for peace with Sunnis
 - 'I have always suspected he was being maneuvered, I have never trusted him'
 - Said Sunnis need to mark their distance from 'Saddam-ites, radical groups, Bin Ladin's men, reiterate their 'no' to the US'

1.4c

SOURCES:

OpenSource, 19 Jan, Al-Sadr calls for 'Immediate US withdrawal'

1.4c 18 Jan, Associates and family members of Abu Dura attempt to flee

OpenSource, 19 JAN, Al-Sadr member reacts to arrests of Al-Darraj

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170126

Current Situation

- **Extremists vary targeting in Kirkuk**
 - **Recent Kirkuk attacks**
 - **Recent high profile attacks against Turkomen civilians, ISF/CF targets**
 - Between 10-15 Jan, 5 VBIEDs, 1 kidnapping against Shi'a Turkomen businesses, homes preceded by demands for money
 - Traditional attack methodology represented by 17 JAN VBIED targeting Quoria IP station
 - **Recent attacks demonstrate TTP variations**
 - **Historical Kirkuk targeting focus against CF, ISF**
 - 65% of HP attacks over previous 6 months targeted security forces
 - **High-profile attacks against Turkomen civilians uncommon**
 - **Attacks included extortion demands for sums exceeding \$300,000**
 - Unit analysis indicates ethnic intimidation likely primary goal rather than extortion
 - May also indicate low-level extremist effort to supplement main funding sources, maintain financial solvency
 - » No reporting to suggest Kirkuk extremist networks low on funds
- ***Recent attack trend likely represents Sunni extremist attempt to exacerbate ethnic tension. Expect sporadic intimidation attacks against Turkomen, Kurds as extremists seek to undermine stability in Kirkuk.***


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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data



Spikes in attack levels sporadic, cause of fluctuation indiscernible

- Resistance and extremists elemtns steady rise in attacking CF, break for Hajj, restore operations post Hajj
 - 16 JAN, FOB Diamondback receive rocket attack
 - 14 JAN, FOB Marez attacked with 68mm rocket
 - 3 JAN, IA checkpoint receive SAF/RPG - NSTR
- Sectarian Violence remains as undercurrent
 - 17 JAN, CF found four bodies, murdered execution style, one badly burned, IP stated that all four were Sunni
 - 15 JAN, SAF attack on 2 LN Shi'a Kurdish Males KIA
 - 15 JAN, SAF attack on 2 LN woman and man killed, shot to the head, ID of LN indicated they were from Tal Afar (most likely Shi'a Turkomen)
 - 14 JAN, two LN separately found, shot in the head
 - 12 JAN, two LN woman and man shot in head and chest
 - 9 JAN, two LN WIA received SAF
 - 9 JAN, one LN killed by unknown
 - 2 JAN, one LN kidnapped on 17 Dec found shot in head
- HP attacks targeting Hard targets
 - 15 JAN, SVBIED attack on the KDP HQ, 38 WIA, 4 KIA
 - 8 JAN, TF 1-9 CAV reported IA mounted patrol received VBIED and SAF attack

Violence escalating against IP, aimed at undermining security gains

- 15 JAN, MAJ Ghaz from IP station SE6 in Mosul, MAJ Ghaz is a Sunni from al Sumar, murdered in drive by shooting
- 15 JAN, 1 Femal IP found dead in car
- 15 JAN, 1 IP KIA shot in head and chest during a drive by shooting
- 14 JAN, 3 IP WIA received IED attack on mounted patrol
- 14 JAN, 1 IP KIA by unknown insurgents
- 11 JAN, a 12 year old boy (later identified as an Arab Sunni Muslim) attempted to fire a RPG at an IP station, the RPG malfunctioned and killed the boy
- 9 JAN, IP WIA, SAF attack drive by shooting
- 9 JAN, IP WIA, received SAF from 6 insurgents armed with PKCs and AK-47s
- 7 JAN, IP/IA encountered SAF attack from vehicles
- 7 JAN, IP checkpoint received SAF and RPG attack, IP did not return fire, could not PID the shooters
- 5 JAN, IP mounted patrol received SAF/RPG fire - NSTR
- 4 JAN, IP checkpoint received SAF in drive by shooting

Energy Resources

Cost of black market propane is 30,000 ID; Kerosence is 200,000 ID per 200 Liters; Benzene cost 22,000 ID for 20 Liters

Electricity levels remain low, averaging four hours per day, people threaten generator operator to keep running the generators

Lack of energy resources, inflation of prices, severe impact on population

Black market; LP 30,000 ID; kerosene 200,000 ID / 200 L; benzene 22,000 ID / 20 L

Electricity levels remain low, averaging four hours per day

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170120

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.
- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

122

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170121

Area of Interest Update

- Meeting between Abbas, Meshaal postponed; Islamists claim recent Somali attacks
 - Damascus meeting between President Abbas, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal postponed
 - Intended to finalize unity government framework following Abbas meeting with al-Assad
 - Persisting disagreement over key ministry posts of finance, interior
 - Factions reportedly close to agreement; Haniyah to lead new government
 - Senior Islamic Courts Council (ICC) leader claimed recent Mogadishu attacks
 - “This is a new uprising by the Somali people”
 - 19 Jan, Ethiopian convoy ambushed in capital by RPG, SAF
 - 18 Jan, Somali presidential compound attacked with mortars, SAF
- *Control of security forces, finances remains key issue preventing Palestinian unity agreement; meeting possible today, final agreement unlikely in near-term.*





123

Sources:

Reuters, 20 Jan 07, Talks Between Palestinians Abbas-Meshaal Postponed

(b)(6) 20 Jan 07, Ethiopian Troops in Somali Ambush






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JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - JAM elements reportedly seeking Abd al-Hadi al-Darraj's release
 - JAM members called the capture a 'disaster'
 - JAM planning to use IP contacts in Abu Ghuraib, where they believe Darraji being held
 - Sadr bloc CoR member stated Sadrists talking to PM Maliki, other IG officials
 - High level JAM affiliates Abu Dura, Sheikh al-Suwaydi 'shocked' by al-Darraji's arrest
 - JAM affiliates reportedly concerned whether MNF or IG ordered arrest operation



Assessment: Sadrists reaction highlights growing pressure on senior leaders; fear new precedent for targeting senior leaders, increased IG resolve to confront JAM. Sadrists will leverage IG contacts in attempt to pressure PM Maliki, secure Darraji's release.

126

SOURCES:

1.4c

20 Jan, JAM seeking to release Darraji
20Jan, High level JAM affiliates

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170121

Current Situation

- **SAFIRE Incidents**
 - **UH-60 flying northeast of Baghdad reportedly hit by SA-7, possible 14.5 mm AAA**
 - A/C shot down in Diyala, approximately 12km northeast of Baghdad
 - Expended SA-7 system recovered 1km from crash site
 - 2 X 14.5mm light AAA also recovered in area
 - No survivors reported
 - **CH-46 south of Fallujah struck by five rounds of SAF**
 - Three rounds impacted windscreen; A/C returned to base
 - **SAFIRE incidents focused in MND-B, MND-N**
 - SAFIRE incidents averaged 55 per month in 2006, majority of incidents SAF attacks, majority ineffective
 - Last 4 months above 2006 average; January on pace to be below average
 - Three confirmed MANPAD impacts in 2006
 - All rotary wing assets; two resulted in A/C losses
 - **Attack claims, methodology suggest Sunni extremist, resistance groups**
 - Jaysh Muhammad (JM), associated with New Ba'ath Party, posted claim on militant website
 - A/C losses historically exploited by multiple extremist, resistance groups
 - AH-64 loss in mid-July claimed by multiple T&FF, resistance groups
 - Possible complex engagement, success with 1st Generation MANPAD suggests well-planned, executed

1.4c

127


SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:


1.4c

SIGACTS

1.4a



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For display only to IRQ



Outlook: ISI states “in Control” of Iraq

- 12 JAN, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) issues response to new CF strategy
 - US relegated to blaming the deteriorating situation on al-Maliki
 - The Baghdad security plan and strategic shift are futile exercises
 - Boosting troop strength only “represents more targets for the mujahidin”
- AQI/ISI’s strategic communications emphasis:
 - Coalition Forces (CF) on verge of defeat
 - The “Crusader forces” scrambling to salvage their dignity
 - ISI is “now at its best” and “has control” over the situation in Iraq
- Sunni community generally unsupportive of ISI concept
 - Highly-placed Saudi clerics unconvinced of legitimacy
 - Main non-AQI Iraqi jihadists clearly non supportive
 - Does not appear to resonate with Iraqi populace or Sunnis in general

Assessment: AQI is attempting to capitalize on recent adjustments in CF strategy by depicting them as acts of desperation, claiming CF withdrawal is imminent and AQI is responsible for CF defeat. Expect similar dismissive yet self-aggrandizing rhetoric in the coming months.

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SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170121

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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129

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170122

Area of Interest Update

- Internal Iranian gov't memo leaked; Factions meet in Damascus; Kenya deports Islamists
 - Open sources reported internal Iranian gov't memo highlighting concern of sanctions
 - Reportedly recommends “making as much political effort as possible to avoid receiving sanctions, while maintaining national interests and honor”
 - Memo states sanctions could cost Iran \$1.5-\$2 billion in lost revenue per year
 - Abbas, Meshaal met in Damascus, first meeting since 2005
 - Both reportedly feared failure to meet would send dangerously negative message to Palestinian people
 - Abbas’ meeting with al-Assad described as “frank, amicable”
 - Kenyan government sent 30 suspected Islamist fighters to Somalia
 - Suspects detained near Somali border





1.4c

130

Sources:

Reuters, 21 Jan 07, Iranian Report Shows Fear of Sanctions






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JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadrists, IG officials announce return to CoR and cabinet, 21 Jan
 - Agreed to unspecified future action on key Sadr demands, including CF withdrawal timeline
 - Other provisions include CoR approval to extend UN mandate for CF, improving ISF capability, bolster Iraqi sovereignty
 - Baha al-A'raji said since 'legitimate demands have been met, we announce our return to IG'
 - Committee to be formed to 'legally formulate' Sadrists' demands
 - Sadrist leaders say they are unfairly targeted by new security measures
 - Said CF arrests of Sadrists indicate 'US do not welcome' their return to IG, 'solely target Sadrists in new security campaign'



Assessment: Agreement falls short of Sadr's initial demands for firm CF withdrawal timetable before rejoining IG. Sadrists will expect government, PM Maliki to intervene to prevent further targeting of senior Sadrist and JAM officials. Sadrists will attempt to portray CF/ISF security operations as disproportionately targeting JAM and Shi'a over Sunni extremists and terrorists.

133

SOURCES:

Open Source, 21 Jan, Iraq: Al-Sadr Trend Deputies Announce Return
Open Source, 21 Jan, Iraq: Multination Force Newspaper Roundup

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCH//Z01/0122
For display only to INQ

Current Situation

- **Complex attack in Mosul**
 - **Complex attack targeted 2/2 IA in Mosul**
 - VBIED initiated attack, reportedly black BMW
 - SAF reported after VBIED detonation
 - **January high profile attacks in Mosul down from 180-day average of six**
 - Fourth high profile attack so far in January, down from December total of seven
 - Suicide attacks in Mosul decreasing during same period
 - One suicide attack in Mosul in each of past two months
 - Tal Afar high profile, suicide attacks increasing during same period
 - **Mosul high profile attacks down for various reasons**
 - Continued pressure from CF, ISF operations
 - Unit analysis indicates facilitation networks in Mosul, Tal Afar possibly sharing assets
 - Reporting indicates VBIED facilitation network in Mosul possibly suffered recent setback
- ***Sunni extremists continue attacks against ISF as part of intimidation efforts; attempt to maintain freedom of operation in key TRV cities. Expect attacks in Mosul, Tal Afar to continue to be inversely proportional as ISF/CF pressure forces shared assets to shift.***

134

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:


MNC-I SIGACTS:

CIDNE Trends Data

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170122

Outlook: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

- National Incidents: 111; down 22% previous week
 - 56 targeted Shi'a, 41 Sunni, 1 Kurd and 13 unattributed
 - Total casualties: 306 killed, 248 injured; up 58% from previous week
- National Ethno-Sectarian Executions Incidents: 101 incidents, down 25% from previous week; 263 killed; down 9%
 - ESEs account for 47% of total casualties; 86% of deaths
 - Daily average of 14; elevated from pre-Golden Mosque baseline of 3
- Baghdad Incidents: 98; down 15% from previous week
 - 56 targeted Shi'a; 40 Sunni; 2 unattributed
 - Total casualties: 279 killed, 216 injured; up 90% from previous week
- Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 89 incidents, down 19% from previous week;
 - 240 killed; same as previous week



Assessment: Ethno-sectarian incidents continue to decrease; however, casualties increased due to successful high profile attacks. Expect increased attempts by Shi'a extremists to conduct retaliatory attacks targeting Sunni civilians in mixed neighborhoods, Amil likely to remain focus.

135

Source: CIDNE (includes NIJC)

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MEF//20170122

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170124

Area of Interest Update

- Protests, strike incite violence in Lebanon; Zawahiri video mocks new Iraq strategy
 - Hezbollah-led general strike, protests incite factional violence in Lebanon; 3 killed, 133 injured
 - PM Siniora postponed trip to Paris for donor conference, vowed to stand firm
 - “We will stay together against intimidation. We will stand together against strife.”
 - Lebanese Army reportedly struggling to keep rival groups apart; protesters closed access to ports, airport
 - Hezbollah vowed to continue pressure, warned of escalation by government
 - Al-Qa’ida deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued video mocking new Iraq security strategy
 - Dismissed force escalation plan, challenged US political leaders to send “entire army” to be defeated
 - Called on American public to “accept the facts of what is happening on the ground, and reject the fantasies with which Bush tries to deceive you”



Protester waving
Hezbollah flag

1.4c


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
Sources:

Reuters, 23 Jan 07, Protests Paralyze Lebanon

(b)(6) 22 Jan 07, AQ Deputy Mocks US Iraq Plan

Site Institute, 22 Jan 03, Zawahiri Addresses US President’s Baghdad Security Plan






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JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - 22 Jan, Sadrist ministers attended meeting of Iraqi PM cabinet
 - Mid-Jan, Sadrists allegedly held discussions in Basrah in Muqtada al-Sadr's absence
 - JAM would cease military role, become an 'ideological organization'
 - Sadrists would concentrate on 'positive opposition' role in Parliament
 - MAS kept informed of developments
 - Possible JAM connection to Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) attack
 - Two individuals aware of attack plans as of 19 Jan
 - Claimed difficulty including mechanical breakdown that hampered operation



1.4c

140

SOURCES:

Open Source, 21 Jan, Iraq: Al-Sadr Trend Ministers attend cabinet meeting

1.4c

23 Jan, New political role being planned for the Sadrists

1.4c

23 Jan, Possibly JAM associated Shaykh, another individual

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z0170124
For display only to IRQ

Current Situation

- **Attack on civilians in Mosul**
 - **VBIED targeted Kurdish Democratic Party building**
 - VBIED reported as GMC pickup truck against Youth Union of KDP
 - 25 local nationals reported injured
 - **Attacks in Mosul increased over last 3 months**
 - Proportion of attacks on civilians increased from 12% of all attacks in October to 23% in December
 - **Recent threat reporting indicated AQI preparing VBIED attacks in Mosul**
 - Attack vehicle assessed to be GMC truck
 - Reporting indicated Kurdish political targets, KDP, PUK offices; no timing
 - KDP forewarned specified targets
 - Extremists may have shifted to Youth Union building for softer target
 - **No attack claim; targeting, methodology indicates AQI, AS**
 - Kurdish target with potential for high civilian casualties
 - Unit analysis indicates Ethnic, Political component of attacks against KDP due to overwhelming Kurdish political representation, Sunni disenfranchisement
- ***Attack intended to demonstrate ISF, IG inability to protect Kurdish civilians, political elements in Mosul. Expect similar attacks as AQI, AS seek to destabilize Mosul, discredit security forces, stoke ethnic tension.***

141

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACTS:

1.4a

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170124
for display only to Iraq

Outlook: Karbala Security Environment

- JAM continues to challenge provincial authorities for dominance; maintaining freedom of operation
- Late Dec, early JAN, JAM targeting opposition
 - Abu Qusay at-Turabi, Badr member in Ministry of Agriculture, assassinated
 - Provincial Councilman Akram Al-Zubaidy reportedly killed by 4 Sadrists
- 20 Jan 07 attack on Karbala JCC
 - US forces attacked by AIF impersonating US soldiers; attack executed with precision and solid tactics indicating advanced training
- **Governor often unwilling to use local forces to engage militants**
 - Requested Iraqi Army aid from central government multiple times
- **Police and local Iraqi Army forces fears retaliation from JAM**
 - JAM exploiting atmosphere of intimidation



Assessment: Although JAM does not have free reign in province, their recent assassination campaign appears to have intimidated government officials in Karbala. Governor Aqil may not have confidence ISF units within Province as evidenced by requests for outside aid. Successful Karbala PIC depends on strengthened relationship between governor & law enforcement to 142 suppress JAM.

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170124

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170125

Area of Interest Update

- Russian firm completes SA-15 delivery to Iran; Lebanese tension abates, agreement possible
 - Russian Interfax News Agency reported Russian defense firm completed SA-15 delivery to Iran
 - Rosoboronexport chief stated delivery to Iran completed in late-December 2006
 - Iranian servicemen have reportedly received operational SA-15 training in Russia
 - 29 total SA-15 systems delivered
 - Open sources report SA-15 range of 6.5nm, 19,700ft
 - Manufacturer claims SA-15 is mobile, short-range system capable against air and missile threats
 - Lebanese nationwide strike ends, tensions subside
 - Beirut press reporting Saudi Arabia, Iran may have intervened to end strike, reduce sectarian tension
 - Agreement for unity government reportedly possible; initiative may be presented at Paris aid conference

SA-15



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Iranian Nuclear Facilities



UNCLASSIFIED

1.4c

144


Sources:


(b)(6)

24 Jan 07, Russia Fulfills Iran Missile Deal

24 Jan 07, Warning of New Lebanon Protests

Reuters, 24 Jan 07, Saudi, Iran Working on Deal to End Lebanon Crisis






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//26170125
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadrists CoR members to visit Kurdish President Mas'ud Barzani in late January
 - Members include Nasir al-Ruba'i, Baha al-Araji
 - Mid-Jan reporting indicated Sadrists planned regional trip following return to IG

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c



1.4c


147

SOURCES:

1.4c

24 Jan, Sadrists to visit Kurdish president

1.4c



Overall Data represents reporting from CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
Data time period: 160001JAN07 – 222400JAN07

This new slide is meant to represent the effect of OTF III on civilian violence in Baghdad. Each week we will highlight 4 significant districts.

- Overall this week Murders and Executions continued to drop, though 11 HP attacks in Rusafa and 2 HP attacks in Sadr City raised overall civilian casualties for the week to 950.
- Murder and Executions remain concentrated in Western Baghdad, particularly in Rashid and Mansour. Attacks have dropped by half in the sectarian fault-line of Ghazaliyah.
- Sectarian violence will continue outside areas of heavy security force operations, with the Aamel/Bayaa area a center of continuing struggle as JAM struggles to consolidate against Sunni groups. Expect this area to see continued displacement of Sunnis.
- HP attacks will focus on high traffic areas of Rusafa with continued attempts to penetrate Sadr City. Heavy Ashura crowds in Kadamiya may also be targeted.

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MEF//20170125

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.
- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.
- 1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170126

Area of Interest Update

- Pro- / anti-government activists clash in Beirut; IAEA requests Iran reverse inspector ban
 - Clashes at Arab University in Beirut escalated to street violence requiring army intervention
 - Fighting reportedly begin between Sunni, Shi'a students with sticks; evolved into SAF exchanges
 - Four killed, 100 injured; Army imposed curfew
 - Witnesses described spontaneous street violence, claimed events not driven by political decisions
 - Leaders from major factions called for calm, unity
 - Nasrallah issued fatwa urging calm, Shi'a followers to obey religious leaders
 - Hariri urged Sunni supporters to show self-restraint
 - Siniora called for a "return to the voice of reason" from Paris international aid conference
 - International donors pledged over \$7.6 billion in aid
 - IAEA issued statement requesting Iranian authorities reverse decision to ban nuclear inspectors
 - Iran announced 38 specific inspectors banned on Tues




1.4c


150

Sources:

Reuters, 25 Jan 07, Deaths in Beirut Cast Shadow over Aid Pledges

OSD (b)(6) UN Nuclear Agency Asks Iran to Back Off on Rejection of 38 Inspectors






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For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Rahim al-Daraji, mayor of Sadr City offered JAM's terms to avoid fight, late Jan
 - Said commanders would forbid JAM to carry weapons in public if CF, IG agreed to cease raids in Sadr City, release detainees
 - 20 Jan, mayor pledged support for new Baghdad security measures
 - Sadrist political committee reportedly 'blessed and supported' Daraji's efforts
- OMS officials to transport Abu Zaynab al-Khalisi's body from Iran to Basrah, then on to Najaf, 26 Jan
 - Khalisi implicated in murder of six UK troops in 2003, spent 3 yrs in CF custody
 - OMS members seek to arrange military parade at border crossing point



Assessment: *Sadrists have repeatedly pledged to refrain from attacking CF, but have not before given direct support for new Baghdad security measures. Offers to disarm likely intended to avert rather than facilitate CF, ISF operations in Sadr City; uncertain how much influence al-Daraji has over JAM elements. Sadrists likely attempting to honor the deceased Khalisi as anti-CF figure.*

153

SOURCES:

New York Times, 25 Jan, Iraqi official offers terms from militia to avoid fight

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170125

Current Situation

- **Motorcycle VBIEDs in Baghdad**
 - **Attack on Shi'a civilians in eastern Baghdad**
 - Motorcycle VBIED targeted civilians IVO Tayeran Square
 - No KIA, 13 LNs injured
 - Same methodology, targeting as 17 January 2 x motorcycle VBIED incident in Tayeran Sq.
 - **Motorcycle VBIEDs more prevalent in recent months**
 - Three motorcycle VBIEDs this month
 - Account for 12% of January VBIEDs in Baghdad
 - » Motorcycle VBIED attacks average 4% of all VBIED attacks over last 6 months
 - **Motorcycle VBIEDs easier to facilitate, afford increased mobility in urban areas**
 - Less infrastructure, funding required for facilitation, assembly
 - Greater freedom of maneuver through use of secondary, tertiary roads
 - Main drawback: inability to place large amounts of explosives on target
 - Mitigated by targeting large outdoor public gatherings
 - **Methodology evolution possibly in response to increased pressures on Sunni extremist VBIED networks from Shi'a militias, ISF, CF**
- ***Sunni extremist VBIED networks possibly reacting to external pressures from Shi'a militias, CF by shifting to less complex facilitation, employment methods. Expect Sunni extremist facilitation cells to continue evolving more versatile attack methodology as security pressure increases in Baghdad.***

154

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACTS:

1.4a

CIDNE Trends Data

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//Z6170126
For display only to Iraq

Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI propaganda volume up 81 to 377
 - Released statements critical of new BSP; claimed BSP proof of US defeat in Anbar, Diyala, Mosul; threatened Peshmerga forces taking part in BSP
 - Announced start of "Voice of the Caliphate" web-based/streaming video channel
 - Claimed "air ambush" downed Blackhawk on 21 Jan in Diyala
- AS propaganda volume up 10 to 53
 - Condemned theft of Sunni property and torture by JAM; urged Sunnis to join jihad; urged insurgents to avoid targeting "common people," and to avoid random attacks
 - Claimed CF helicopter shot down with SAFIRE on 13 Jan in Al Fadl area of Baghdad
- IAI propaganda volume up 71 to 95
 - Claimed "air ambushes group" shot down helicopter on 23 Jan in Al-Midan, Baghdad
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume up 6 to 62
 - Mujahideen Army posted statement denying Abu Husayn al-Baghdadi speaks for them
 - New group announced: "Abu-Mus'ab Brigade" joining "great battle of Baghdad"

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume down 38 to 55
 - Ba'ath Party elected Al-Duri as the new General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq
 - Islamic Front criticized BSP; doubted crackdown on Shia militias; resolved to fight on

Assessment: Attacks against CF helicopters, criticism of BSP common themes this week; SAFIRE against CF aircraft may increase due to international media attention, perception of IO success by extremists. Expect increasing calls for defense of Baghdad and unity of Sunni groups against Shia militia.

155

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170126

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

156

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170127

Area of Interest Update

- Lebanese funerals prompt calls for unity; Iran demands removal of senior inspector; Mogadishu radio claims US soldiers missing
 - Hezbollah held funerals for three Shi'a followers killed during sectarian clashes Thursday
 - Hezbollah official urged unity, restraint
 - Mourners called for reprisal, "death to Siniora"
 - Beirut newspaper headline: "God Damn Whoever Awakened It," referring to sectarian violence
 - Lebanese army lifted curfew; no violence Friday
 - Iran demanded removal of chief IAEA inspector for Iranian program, (b)(6)
 - Accused (b)(6) of sharing sensitive information about Iranian nuclear sites
 - Mogadishu radio claiming US soldiers, FBI agents missing in southern Somalia
 - Reports assert Americans held by Islamic Courts Council (ICC) fighters in south



1.4c


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
Sources:

Reuters, 26 Jan 07, Hezbollah Buries Dead, Urges Lebanese Unity

Reuters, 26 Jan 07, Iran Wants Senior Atom Inspector Out

OSC (b)(6) Details Said Emerging on US Soldiers 'Held in Southern Somalia'






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JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

- Senior Sadrists believe JAM will capitulate if attacked
 - Plans allegedly underway to convert some JAM elements into government-sanctioned security forces, with responsibility for Sadr City
- Sadr reported to be in Tehran with senior aide
- JAM leaders may leave Baghdad, fear they are being targeted by CF
 - Some allegedly planning to relocate to Karbala or nearby countries like Syria and Jordan



Assessment: Sadr's continued absence contributing to low JAM morale, belief among some senior leaders JAM will not fight CF. JAM likely attempting to co-opt semi-legitimate security role in Sadr City to maintain authority, image as Shi'a protector. JAM leaders likely seeking refuge from targeting during new Baghdad security plan, intend to return, resume activities and position within JAM.

160

SOURCES:

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170127

Current Situation

- **Suicide attack outside Mosul mosque**
 - SVEST detonated outside Shi'a mosque in Al Quabh, NW Mosul
 - Casualties minimized due to quick reaction by IP; tackled bomber, DOW
 - 1 x IP KIA, 5 x LNs injured
 - High profile attacks on civilians in Mosul exceeding 2006 highs
 - Three HP attacks on civilians so far in January
 - 2006 maximum of two HP attacks targeting civilians per month, average of one attack every two months
 - HP attacks on civilians accounted for 30% in December, 40% in January
 - Above 2006 average of less than 10% per month in Mosul
 - Targeting, methodology suggests Sunni extremist involvement, possible sectarian implications
 - Extremists focused on CF, ISF in attempt to maintain freedom of movement along TRV; civilian attacks increasing; sectarian attacks uncommon
 - Suicide attacker reportedly mosque ex-employee, unknown religious confession
 - Previous SVEST attacks in north TRV linked to extremist facilitation networks
- ***Sunni extremist HP targeting in Mosul intended to discredit, destabilize ISF, IG; civilian attacks increasing in proportion. Yesterday's attack suggests possible evolution in targeting strategy to include exploitation of sectarian identities.***

161

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACTS:

1.4a

Page 163 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

Approved for Release

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170127

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of Mol elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

163

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170128

Area of Interest Update


- ElBaradei calls for "timeout"; Lebanese army commander states forces under pressure; Gaza factions continue fighting
 - IAEA director ElBaradei called for suspension of sanctions, enrichment by Iran, UNSC members
 - Proposal calls for temporary suspension of activity by both sides, diplomatic talks
 - Followed Iranian announcement of industrial-scale equipment installation planned for Feb
 - Commander of Lebanese army, Gen Suleiman stated forces under pressure keeping peace
 - Called for resumption of political discourse
 - Stated army capable of sustaining pressure, but civilian leaders must "bear responsibility in preventing security disturbances"
 - Fatah, Hamas continued clashes in Gaza
 - SAF engagements reported near Islamic University; 16 killed Friday




1.4c

164

Sources:






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JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

- Sadrists caveat support for new Baghdad security plan
 - Sadrist leader said Sadr city would be subject to new security plan 'as long as it is only ISF that are implementing the plan'
- Basrah JAM allegedly plan to collect British military uniforms for movement through CF checkpoints
 - Order issued by JAM senior leadership on 24 Jan
 - JAM reportedly willing to pay any amount for uniform items



Recent JAM Activity

Assessment: Sadrists attempting to reassert some authority, will negotiate in hopes of preventing large-scale CF operations in Sadr City. Acquiring CF uniforms would allow JAM greater freedom of movement; suggest JAM possibility planning to conduct offensive attack against CF.

167

SOURCES:

Open Source, 27 Jan, Al-Sadr trend aide voices support for Baghdad's new security plan

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170125

Current Situation

- **Civilians targeted in market attacks**
 - **Complex coordinated VBIED attack targeted civilians in New Baghdad**
 - 2 X VBIEDs against open air market, reportedly followed by SAF
 - Received international media coverage
 - Significant casualties reported
 - **Rusafa, New Baghdad area focus of recent high profile attacks**
 - 2006 New Baghdad averaged 2.6 attacks per month
 - Three HP attacks in January
 - Last 2 months also above average with 4 attacks in both November, December
 - **No attack claims; targeting, methodology consistent with AQI**
 - Attack characteristics consistent with traditional Abu Nur methodology
 - Complex VBIED attack focused on large Shiite gathering places for maximum effectiveness
- ***Continued use of high profile methodology in attempt to escalate sectarian violence, demonstrate ability to defend Sunnis, undermine security efforts. Expect measured retaliatory response within mixed, Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad over next 72 hours.***

168


SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:


MNC-I SIGACTS:

Open Sources: FOX, CNN, BBC

CIDNE Trends Data



SECRET//REL TO USA, MCEP//20170128
For display only to IRQ



Outlook: AQI Response to SAA Challenge

- AQI has not attempted assassination campaign against Sahawa al-Anbar (SAA) leadership
 - Change from early 06 when AQI assassinated powerful sheikhs, paralyzed al-Anbar People's Committee
 - No sheikh on 14-member SAA leadership council has been assassinated
- Lower profile murder and intimidation (M&I) has occurred
 - Jan 07, AQI reportedly murdered Albu Faraj members north of Ramadi
 - Dec 06, 1x SVBIED against IP station in Albu Risha tribal area
 - Nov 06, strikes on Albu Soda checkpoints east of Ramadi
 - Oct 06, 2x SVBIEDs on checkpoints near Skeikh Sattar's Ramadi compound
- AQI has shifted operations to more permissive environments; attempted negotiation and appeasement
 - Limited reporting of AQI elements moving further west
 - Offers of payment to tribes, replacing foreign emirs unpopular with locals

Assessment: AQI leaders likely have made strategic choice to challenge SAA influence without resorting to leadership assassination; attempting to undercut SAA through negotiation and lower level M&I acts. As SAA threat grows, AQI may revert to use of assassinations as means to intimidate sheikhs on leadership council.

169

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//2017012R

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

 pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

170

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCEI//20170129

Area of Interest Update


- Palestinian factions accept Saudi invitation; Iran reviewing "timeout" proposal; Ethiopians reducing presence in Somalia
 - Hamas, Fatah accepted invitation by Saudi King Abdullah for mediation in Mecca to end clashes
 - 23 killed over past three days, derailing unity talks
 - Member of Hamas police force assassinated, senior Fatah intelligence official abducted in Gaza
 - Iranian official stated proposal for nuclear "timeout" to be reviewed, considered
 - "Iran's nuclear issue is a multi-faceted issue and we cannot say yes or no to such a suggestion. Such a suggestion should be developed."
 - IAEA director, ElBaradei, called for simultaneous suspension of UN sanctions, Iranian enrichment
 - Ethiopia to cut force in Somalia by one-third
 - PM stated one-third of force will depart today; intends to withdrawal remainder "within weeks"



1.4c

171

Sources:



Page 174 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

Approved for Release

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For display only to IIR

Current Situation

- **Ramadi IPs attacked**
 - **Suicide VBIED with chemical tank targeted ERU compound**
 - Dump truck SVBIED detonated inside compound during morning IP formation
 - Casualties exhibited symptoms consistent with exposure to chlorine gas
 - Post blast analysis indicates 3'x5' tank recovered, possibly 1-ton capacity
 - Chlorine widely utilized in water purification facilities throughout Iraq
 - Truck accessed compound by posing as construction vehicle
 - Over 70 ISF casualties; *currently no indications of chemical casualties*
 - **Reporting indicates Sunni extremists have obtained chlorine**
 - November 2006 reporting indicated AQI, affiliates successfully obtained 100 lb chlorine cylinders; likely originated from water purification plants
 - October 2006 reporting indicated plot to employ stolen 1-ton chlorine cylinders in VBIEDs
 - **Demonstrates continued AQI intent to effectively deliver chemical agent**
 - Chemical likely intended to augment kill radius beyond initial explosives
 - Two past attempts to incorporate 100lb chlorine cylinders in VBIEDs ineffective
 - Likely due to large amount of explosives relative to chlorine
 - Perception of successful chemical attack could spur additional attempts
- ***Attack indicates evolution of AQI VBIED tactics to effectively employ chemical component and increase lethality of traditional VBIEDs, cause panic among populous, enhance IO impact. Expect continued AQI attempts to obtain chemicals, refine employment, limited by ability to obtain chemical material.***

174

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACTS: 1.4a

CIDNE Trends Data

20061108 MNF-I-INT-CIOC Second Chlorine VBIED Attack in al-Anbar



20061120 MNF-I-INT-CIOC Al-Anbar Extremists Accessing Chlorine Originating from Water Treatment Stocks

20061123 CIOC Information Paper: Analysis of Chlorine Threats

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170129

Outlook: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

- National Incidents: 174; up 7% from previous week
 - 75 targeted Shi'a, 56 Sunni, and 43 unattributed
 - Total casualties: 365 killed, 341 injured; up 5% from previous week
- National Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 157 incidents, up 5% from previous week; 230 killed; down 32% from previous week
 - Ethno-Sectarian Executions account for 33% of total casualties; 63% of deaths
 - Daily average of 22; elevated from pre-Golden Mosque baseline of 3
- Baghdad Incidents: 150; same as previous week
 - 74 targeted Shi'a; 56 Sunni; 20 unattributed
 - Total casualties: 319 killed, 255 injured; down 5% from previous week
- Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions:
 - 138 incidents, up 3% from previous week;
 - 196 killed; down 36% from previous week



Assessment: Ethno-sectarian casualties increased due to successful high profile attacks targeting civilians in Shi'a communities of Baghdad. Expect execution casualties to remain lower as Shi'a militant retaliation likely impacted by flight of JAM leadership, concern of ISF/CF detainment operations within Baghdad.

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SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MEF//20170120

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.
- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170130

Area of Interest Update

- Turkish police announce al-Qa'ida arrests; Palestinian groups claim suicide attack; Abbas sets 10 February unity gov't deadline
 - Turkish police announced arrest of 46 al-Qa'ida militants across five provinces
 - Several detained near Iraq border in Mardin
 - AQ claimed suicide attack against Istanbul synagogues in Nov 03
 - Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility for SVEST in Israel
 - Suicide attack killed 3 in Red Sea resort, Eilat
 - First suicide attack in Israel since April 2006
 - Ceasefire between Israel, Palestinians in Gaza in effect since late November
 - Senior aide to Palestinian president stated Abbas set 10 Feb deadline for unity deal
 - Abbas planning to call early legislative, presidential elections if no unity agreement



1.4c


177


Sources:

Turkish Police Detain 46 AQ Suspects

Reuters, 29 Jan 07, Palestinian Militants Kill Three in Eilat Attack

OSC (b)(6) Abbas Said to Deliver 'Important Speech'; Sets 10 Feb Deadline for Unity Gov't






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For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Sadr reportedly plans to cooperate with Sunni parties
 - Senior Sadrist Baha al-Araji announced agreement to form joint security committees with Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), cooperate with ISF
 - OMS offices in southern Iraq suffering from leadership shortages, low morale
 - Basrah OMS office closed; Amarah, Kut, Hillah, and Diwaniya offices lack managers
 - During operation on 27 Jan, JAM members purportedly ordered not to engage CF
 - Several JAM associates, brothers of Abu Iyah, detained
 - Abu Iyah is JAM commander in SW Baghdad



Assessment: Cooperation with Sunnis part of ongoing political engagement intended to deter CF/ISF targeting; formation of durable Sadr/IIP alliance unlikely. Shortage of OMS leaders suggests recruitment difficulties, possibly impacted by recent CF/ISF targeting. Abu Iyah operation illustrates Sadrist' reluctance to engage CF, fear of repercussions.

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SOURCES:
Open Source, 29 Jan, Iraq: Multinational Force Newspaper Roundup; Sunni-Shiite pact

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170130

Current Situation

- **Attack on civilians, ISF in Adhamiyah**
 - **VBIED attacked civilians, ISF TCP near Sadr City**
 - Detonated at traffic circle in Mustansariyah Square
 - Intersection of Routes Grizzlies, Vernon
 - One IP KIA, 19 LNs killed, 4 LNs wounded
 - **High profile targeting of ISF down, more civilian focus in East Baghdad**
 - Four HP attacks in east Baghdad targeted ISF in January, three in December
 - Down significantly from 2006 average of seven per month
 - 18 HP attacks in January against civilians in east Baghdad exceeded 2006 average of 13 per month
 - Last three months also exceeded 2006 monthly average
 - **Methodology, targeting consistent with Abu Nur, Rusafa VBIED network**
 - Continued focus on predominantly Shi'a areas
 - Attack may have targeted TCP due to high volume of civilian traffic
 - Possibly intended for Sadr City but was stopped or prematurely detonated
- ***AQI HP attack targeting civilians, ISF in Adhamiyah intended to destabilize Shi'a enclave, undermine security efforts, discredit ISF. Expect continued efforts by Sunni extremists to target Shi'a civilians East of the Tigris to incite sectarian reprisal activity.***

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACTS:

1.4a

CIDNE Trends Data

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170130 For display only to Iraq		
CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 20 - 26 January 2007
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOI committee produced the draft Hydrocarbon Bill governing Iraq's oil fields. According to the draft all revenues, exploration and development rights would pass through the federal government.
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Sectarian incidents: 174; up 7% previous week National Sectarian casualties: 706; up 5% National executions: 230 KIA; down 32% Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 150; up 3% Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 574; down 5% Baghdad executions: 196 KIA; down 36%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rahim al-Daraji, Mayor of Sadr City reportedly pledges support for Operation TOGETHER FORWARD and cooperation with security forces on behalf of Sadr City's militia and political leaders. States field commanders would forbid militias to carry weapons on the streets.
Population movements	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No new IDP data; internally displaced families in Iraq: IOM: 60,243; MoDM: 55,003 (no update since Oct) Forced displacement predominately in Rashid, Mansour, Adhamiyah, northern Karkh and Khadamiyah
Assessment: Despite multiple ethno-sectarian stakeholders, draft of Hydrocarbon bill reinforces a nationalist approach. National sectarian attacks continue to decrease, but effective VBIED attacks continue to result in increased casualties. Sadr City's Mayor's unusual pledge of direct support for CF/ISF operations likely aimed at avoiding open confrontation during Baghdad operations, but unlikely to disarm JAM in Sadr City; further indication of apprehension over recent JAM arrests.		

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1. A. CIOC IM 24 Jan 07 *Al-Iraqiya* report of Sadr City Mayor and Sadrist support for security measures.
- B. 20 Jan 2007 NY Times online article *Iraq's new draft hydrocarbons law will pave the way for 'transparent and fair' competition.*
1. CIOC 26 Jan Ethno-Sectarian weekly slide
2. MNC-I Int Summary 28 Jan – covering 270000C – 272359C.
3. CIOC Information Paper – Is Sectarian Cleansing Occurring.

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MEF//20170130

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170121

Area of Interest Update

- Detained AQ militants had planned attacks; Nasrallah blames West in Ashura address
 - Turkish authorities stated initial questioning of recently detained al-Qa'ida militants indicated large-scale attack planning was in late-stages
 - 48 suspected al-Qa'ida militants detained by Turkish police last week, some near Iraq border
 - Investigators claim militant leader used code name "Usume," took directives from Zarqawi
 - Hezbollah leader Nasrallah accused Western leaders of creating chaos in Lebanon
 - Rejected charge Hezbollah has incited recent violence; claimed Western entities responsible
 - Nasrallah: "those responsible for creating chaos must be called to account"
 - Addressed hundreds of thousands of Shi'a Lebanese in southern Beirut suburb during Ashura ceremony




1.4c


184

Sources:

OSC (b)(6) Turkey: Caught AQ Members Said Were Preparing Bomb Attacks in Big Cities

Reuters, 30 Jan 07, Hezbollah Leader Nasrallah Attacks Bush





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For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Najaf JAM commanders reportedly offered to send fighters to battle insurgents responsible for 28 Jan Najaf attack
 - Some JAM commanders allegedly prepared to contact CF about the matter
 - Former rogue JAM leadership may be willing to help maintain control, limit activities of JAM
 - Focus areas to include JAM Baghdad strongholds, JAM-ISF conflict areas in south



Assessment: Sadrists fear perception JAM was involved in Najaf attack; concern is driving offer to send fighters to battle insurgents. JAM agreement to limit activities covers Shi'a majority areas only, does not appear to include JAM sectarian violence against Sunnis. Rogue leaders' history of facilitating anti-Coalition violence, distance from Sadr may provide leverage over more independent and rogue JAM elements, enhance ability to limit and control.

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SOURCES:

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170121
For display only to IRQ

Current Situation

- **Ashura attacks in Diyala**
 - **SVEST targeted Shi'a mosque in Balad Ruz**
 - Initial reports indicate bomber was dressed as a woman
 - Similar methodology as 26 January SVEST attack against Shi'a mosque in Mosul
 - Open sources reported bomber targeted large Shi'a gathering outside mosque
 - Reportedly over 95 casualties
 - **IED targeted civilians in Khanaqin, northeast of Baqubah near Iranian border**
 - Targeted group of Shi'a marching toward mosque for Ashura celebrations
 - Reportedly over 45 casualties
 - Open sources reported majority of casualties were Kurdish Shi'a
 - **Ashura threat reporting**
 - Recent reporting of AQI foreign fighters located north of Baghdad intending to execute SVEST attacks on Ashura pilgrims
 - **No attack claims; targeting, methodology, threat reporting indicate AQI**
 - Attacks possibly carried out in northern areas due to increased security in Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala
 - Threats to Shi'a pilgrims along LOCs IVO Najaf, security increased to address threat
 - Likely intended to capitalize on heightened Shi'a sensitivity during Ashura, provoke sectarian response, contribute to IO campaign by capturing international media attention
- **AQI focused attacks on Shi'a Ashura observances to provoke sectarian response, demonstrate lack of security, capture media attention. Expect continued extremist attempts to inflict significant casualties on Shi'a pilgrims as they return to their home cities.**

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACT

1.4a

Open Sources

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170131
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Outlook: Sadr's Absence Draws Notice

- Sadr's continued absence from Iraq and apparent detachment from events causing anxiety among followers, speculation in the media

1.4b, 1.4d

- Media reporting JAM commanders fled Baghdad for Kut, Babil, Taji, neighboring countries
- Prolonged absence causing some aides to question Sadr's leadership, motives for leaving
- Sadr's continued lack of response to arrests, CF/ISF operations demoralizing JAM members

- Sadrist have historically touted their "nationalist" credentials against "exiles" such as SCIRI/Dawa

- Much of the Sadrist credibility during Saddam era refusal to go into exile and standing up adopted similar post OIF role



Sadr often wears a white shroud to symbolize his readiness for martyrdom, as "Shi'a protector"

1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170131

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